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Summary
Introduction
New Deal 25 plus (ND25+) provides job search assistance, training opportunities
and work placements to people aged between 25 and the state pension age who
have been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for 18 out of 21 months. It
comprises three stages:
• Gateway - up to four months of intensive jobsearch assistance;
• IAP (Intensive Activity Period) - a variety of assistance (training, work experience
etc.) lasting 13 to 52 weeks;
• Follow-through - further jobsearch assistance for up to three months.
At present, people aged 50 and over on ND25+ can volunteer to participate in the
IAP.
The Pensions Green Paper Simplicity, security and choice: working and saving for
retirement announced the intention to run a pilot study mandating participation.
This has been running since April 2004 in 14 Jobcentre Plus districts. This report
documents the evaluation to date of the effect of the mandate. Results are interim
at this stage – final results will be available in a later report due in 2008.
Design of the evaluation
The evaluation follows a random assignment (or ‘experimental’) design. Individuals
participating in the pilots are randomly assigned to either an ‘action’ group for
whom IAP participation is mandatory or a ‘control’ group for whom participation
remains voluntary. The strength of this approach is that it permits the most robust
evaluation of the effects of the mandate as it avoids the selection bias that can result
with alternative approaches – other approaches rely on untestable assumptions. In
terms of internal validity (the ability to identify a causal effect) experimental
estimates are unrivalled. However, as with any pilot study there is the need to
consider how realistic the findings are for non-pilot areas, i.e. do the results have
external validity? There are also potential problems that are unique to experiments.
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In practical terms, the design of the evaluation was such that random assignment
would take place at the time of ND25+ entry. Since individuals find out at the time of
random assignment whether they will be required to participate in IAP or whether
any participation will be voluntary, it is from this point onwards that the effects of the
mandate can be observed. While it is conceivable that the existence of a mandate
might affect behaviour before ND25+ entry, discussions with Department for Work
and Pensions (DWP) suggest that this is unlikely.
The analysis is based on data collected at the time of random assignment and on the
New Deal Evaluation Database. Up until August 2005, 2,622 individuals had
participated in the pilots. The total number of participants expected by the end of
the pilot period is about 4,000. This is less by a third than original expectations.
The customer group in pilot areas
The following is a summary of the customer group in the pilot areas:
• 75 per cent are men;
• they are fairly evenly spread throughout the 50-58 age range, with a slight dip
at age 59;
• 86 per cent are white British, seven per cent are Asian or Asian British;
• 51 per cent have no qualifications; 17 per cent hold higher education
qualifications;
• 40 per cent used to work in manual occupations, 32 per cent as semi-skilled or
skilled workers and eight per cent in office jobs. There is also a high share of
former professionals or managers among the clients – 20 per cent;
• only 29 per cent are partnered. Only ten per cent of all customers live with
partners who are working;
• 93 per cent of participants are not working at all at the time of random
assignment.
Internal validity of the experiment
As a summary of the tests on internal validity, the randomisation was successful and
balanced almost all observable characteristics between both groups. This provides
some reassurance that the control group is well suited to providing a counterfactual
outcome for the action group. There are some slight differences at the level of the
individual Jobcentre Plus district which may disappear as the sample size increases.
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External validity of the results
Pilot areas account for only one-fifth of the target population nationwide. A
comparison of pilot and non-pilot areas shows customers in pilot areas are older,
they less frequently report disabilities and are more often white. Also, they tend to
remain longer on benefit before entering the Gateway. It will be important to take
account of these differences when considering the possible effect of extending the
mandate to non-pilot areas.
There are also significant differences between pilot and non-pilot areas in the type of
option implemented. This reduces the scope for generalising the results and may
mean that the estimated effects would not apply to all areas but only those
implementing IAP in a similar way to the pilot areas.
There are some indications of implementational deviations from the design of the
experiment. Many eligible customers are not randomly assigned at all and some are
assigned long after entering ND25+. This is potentially problematic when seeking to
generalise the results since it is not currently possible to observe why such deviations
occur. The consequence of late random assignment is that the role of anticipatory
effects while on the Gateway is reduced. The estimated treatment effect is less likely
to correspond to the effect which would be found if the mandate were introduced
nationally since a nationwide implementation would affect the whole period on
ND25+, rather than just the post-randomisation Gateway.
There are also deviations from the design of the mandate. In particular, while those
who have previously participated in ND25+ after the age of 50 and those who do not
have the required 18 months JSA spell should be excluded from the mandate, this is
often not upheld in practice. However, these are deviations that are also likely to
occur elsewhere were the mandate extended beyond the pilot areas so, rather than
being problematic, they are likely to permit estimates to take better account of
possible real-world imperfections in implementation.
Evaluation results – simple comparisons
Simple comparison revealed differences between the action and control groups in
the ND25+ experience:
• Most participants of both the action and control groups leave the Gateway within
seven months of random assignment. Action group members spend, on average,
20 days longer on the Gateway than those in the control group who voluntarily
enter IAP.
• The share of participants in IAP is much bigger for the action group than for the
control group. In addition, the action group were slower than the control group
to return to regular signing for JSA.
• The employment outcomes are different for both groups, and the action group
shows a higher share of participants starting unsubsidised employment after
randomisation than the control group.
4 Summary
Evaluation results – regression analysis and duration analysis
The effects on unsubsidised employment and claiming non-JSA benefits were
estimated using both regression analysis and duration analysis. An important caveat
to the results is that they consider only the immediate destination on leaving ND25+
and do not allow for the possibility that individuals change their status after this
time. The consequence of this is that the true effects are likely to be smaller than the
results presented in this report. It has already been noted that these are only interim
results; for the final report, it will be important to address such shortcomings in the
data.
Regression analysis results
The estimated overall effect on unsubsidised employment is positive, suggesting
that mandating IAP increases the outflows to employment. Thirty-six weeks after
random assignment, those mandated to participate in IAP are five percentage points
more likely to have found work than those for whom IAP is voluntary. This rises to
about eight percentage points after about a year, although this is based on the small
number of individuals for whom outcomes of this length can be observed. There
appears to be some effect on claiming benefits other than JSA, although this is only
significant between 24 and 27 weeks after random assignment, at around three
percentage points.
There is some variation by Jobcentre Plus district. Taking the three biggest districts,
the evidence suggests that mandating IAP has beneficial employment effects in
Coventry and Warwickshire and Essex, without the adverse effect of moving
individuals to other benefits. In Leicestershire, it appears that mandating IAP causes
individuals to claim other benefits but not to enter unsubsidised employment.
There is also variation by level of qualification. The results show that mandating IAP
appears to work well for those with no qualifications and those with GCSE or
equivalent qualifications; they become more likely to find unsubsidised employment
and no more likely to claim non-JSA benefits. It works poorly for those with
qualifications equivalent to NVQ level 1; they tend to avoid employment and move
to a non-JSA benefit as a result of being mandated to IAP. The outcomes of those
educated to A-level standard or higher appear unaffected by the mandate.
Duration analysis results
Duration analysis is used as an alternative modelling approach that avoids the
limitation with the regression analysis results that the longer-term outcomes can
only be modelled for that subset of the sample who are observed sufficiently long
after randomisation. The results of the duration analysis broadly agree with those of
the regression analysis and provide some reassurance that those earlier results are
not being driven by cohort effects. However, there are some differences, particularly
when considering variations in the treatment effect across those with different levels
of qualification. It was only among those with no qualifications that a significant
5employment effect of mandating IAP was found. Other individuals (apart from those
with higher education qualifications) were more likely to claim a non-JSA benefit as
a result of the mandate.
Conclusion
The 2006 welfare reform Green Paper A new deal for welfare: empowering people
to work announced the intention to roll out mandatory IAP for the over-50s
nationally. The results in this report provide some early evidence on the effect of
mandating IAP. On the basis of the data available, the indications are that
mandating IAP increases movements into employment, but has a weaker effect on
movements from JSA to other benefits. The probability of moving from ND25+ to
unsubsidised employment within a year of entering ND25+ was estimated at just
below 29.8 per cent for those mandated to participate in IAP and 23.4 per cent for
those not mandated – a difference of 6.4 percentage points. Corresponding
estimated probabilities for movements to non-JSA benefits are 16.4 per cent and
11.3 per cent. The probability of moving to IB within a year of starting ND25+ was
estimated at 13.9 per cent for those mandated and 10.1 per cent for those not
mandated. However, this difference was only marginally significant. The results also
suggest variation in effectiveness across region and level of qualification.
While the evaluation appears to be progressing well overall, two recommendations
follow from the results presented:
• the reason for implementation of the experiment deviating from the design should
continue to be investigated and proper implementation encouraged where
appropriate for the remaining duration of the pilots; and
• adequate data should be made available to investigate outcomes beyond initial
ND25+ exit. This additional data should include administrative benefit records
and could also include administrative records on employment spells and even
survey data, if that were felt to be appropriate.
Summary

71 Introduction
1.1 Policy background
The intention to run a pilot study mandating participation in the New Deal 25 plus
(ND25+) Intensive Activity Period (IAP) for people aged 50-59 who have been
claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for 18 months was announced in the Pensions
Green Paper Simplicity, security and choice: working and saving for retirement
(December 2002). Long-term unemployed jobseekers aged 25 to 49 are already
required to participate in the IAP because it offers extensive help back into work. At
present, New Dealers aged 50 and over can volunteer to take up this extra help.
However, many choose not to, perhaps reflecting their demoralisation about the
chance of returning to work.1 The aim of the pilot study is to assess whether
mandatory participation can assist in the return to work.
1.2 An overview of ND25+
The ND25+ programme is focused on jobseekers aged between 25 and the state
pension age. Like the other New Deal (ND) programmes, it aims to encourage
jobseekers to improve their jobsearch efforts and at providing them with necessary
skills, opportunities and motivation. Individuals must join the programme if they
have been unemployed and claiming JSA for 18 of the previous 21 months. In some
cases, participants may join the programme earlier. Individuals receiving Pension
Credit may also volunteer to join.
1 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Tabulation Tool shows that, in
November 2005, of those ND25+ participants aged 50-59, only 12 per cent
were on the IAP.
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1 After an initial interview, participants on ND25+ enter the Gateway. This usually
lasts up to four months. During this time, individuals are provided with intensive
assistance in their job search process.
2 Those not successful in finding employment in the Gateway period can
subsequently start the IAP. A variety of assistance is offered under the IAP
including: basic skills support, work focused training, work experience, work
placements, jobsearch skills and other support. It typically lasts 13 weeks and, if
necessary, can be extended to 26 weeks or 52 weeks for participants on the full
time education and training option. Participants on IAP receive a training
allowance, equivalent to their JSA amount plus a top-up.
3 The third stage is the Follow-Through period. During this period, those still on
ND25+ are provided with further assistance in finding regular employment. The
Follow-Through normally lasts for six weeks, but can be extended to 13 weeks
in some cases to allow the jobseeker to undertake further activity similar to that
available in the IAP.
Currently, IAP is mandatory for ND25+ participants aged 25-49 at the start of the
Gateway but voluntary for customers older than 50 at the beginning of the
Gateway.
1.3 Piloting mandatory IAP for those aged 50-59
1.3.1 Random assignment
The pilots were designed in such a way as to allow a robust evaluation of their
effectiveness. To achieve this, eligible customers were randomly assigned to either
one of two groups. For those in the first group (the so-called ‘Action’ group),
participation in IAP was mandatory. For those in the second (‘Control’) group, there
was no change; participation in IAP remained voluntary. For obvious reasons, such a
procedure is termed ‘random assignment’ (RA) and evaluations based on RA are
termed ‘experimental’.
RA is widely acknowledged as the best approach for policy evaluation. The
advantage over alternative approaches is that it results in two groups of people (the
action and control groups) who are statistically identical2 except for the fact that the
action group is exposed to the policy intervention (the ‘treatment’, in the jargon of
evaluation) while the control group is not. Since this is the only dimension over
which these two groups differ, any post-randomisation differences in outcomes can
be attributed to the effect of the treatment. The outcomes of the control group can
2 By ‘statistical equivalence’ we mean that there are no systematic differences
between the action and control group; all observed differences arise purely from
variation within the overall population.
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the action group would have been had they not been exposed to the treatment – the
so-called counterfactual.
Evaluation methods that are not based on RA cannot identify two statistically
identical groups and typically have to rely on a comparison of those who receive the
treatment with those who do not receive the treatment. In the context of this
evaluation, were RA not possible and pilots were instead carried out in some other
way, customers mandated to participate in IAP would have characteristics different
from those not mandated to participate. Since these differences may influence
subsequent outcomes of interest, a simple comparison of outcomes could not be
viewed as an estimate of the effect of mandating participation. Whereas RA
automatically provides an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual that is needed to
estimate the effect of treatment, with non-experimental evaluations untestable
assumptions are required. Consequently, non-experimental evaluations are wholly
dependent on the veracity of their underlying assumptions and must therefore
always be viewed with this caveat.
Although RA represents something of a gold-standard for evaluation, it has rarely
been used in the UK. There are a number of reasons for this including the potential
expense of experiments and the fact that pilots have to be planned with RA in mind;
it is not possible to carry out a post hoc experimental evaluation. Occasionally ethical
objections to experiments are sometimes voiced, particularly where a service is
denied to those who may benefit from it. In the context of mandatory IAP, such
ethical concerns should not prove a problem since the potential benefit of treatment
is not being denied to anybody; those in the control group can still participate in IAP
voluntarily. A fuller discussion of RA is provided in Chapter 3.
1.3.2 Eligibility for inclusion in the experiment
The experiment includes those JSA claimants with a continuous JSA spell of 18
months who are entering ND25+ for the first time as a person aged 50-59. A
substantial proportion of customers enter ND25+ with a JSA claim of less than 18
months, particularly in areas where the Incapacity Benefit (IB) reforms pilots are
implemented (see below). Those leaving IB in these areas are excluded from the
experiment.
The pilots have been running since 5 April 2004 in 11 Jobcentre Plus areas and since
10 January 2005 in an additional three Jobcentre Plus areas.3 The pilots were
designed to run continuously for two years and so were due to end in April 2006 for
11 areas and in December 2006 for the three remaining areas. Following the
decision to roll mandatory IAP out nationally, it has been decided to end the pilot
early in the three remaining areas.
3 The pilots were delayed in three areas (Derbyshire; Gateshead & South Tyneside;
and, Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute) since these were pilot sites for the
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration project. It was
decided that the IAP pilots should not start until recruitment to the ERA pilots
ended. By avoiding overlap of the pilots, any contamination effect of ERA on the
mandatory IAP pilots will be minimised.
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In addition to the IAP pilots, some of the areas are also piloting other policy
enhancements. An important example is the IB pilots. In IB pilot areas, IB recipients
attend work focused interviews and those leaving IB for JSA may start ND25+
subsequently, including an IAP stage. Since IB recipients are also more likely to
belong to older age groups than JSA claimants, many new customers aged 50-59
will start IAP in areas with both pilots. This might affect the IAP options available to
other customers.
The Jobcentre Plus areas in which the pilots are running were chosen to include all
seven IB Reform pilot areas. Additional factors influencing the selection of pilot areas
include the number of eligible flow customers aged 50-59 and their geographical
location.
Table 1.1 Mandatory IAP pilot areas
Jobcentre Plus area IB pilot ERA pilot IAP pilot IAP go-live date
Bridgend, Rhondda, Cynon & Taff X X 5 April 2004
Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire X 5 April 2004
Calderdale & Kirklees X 5 April 2004
Coventry & Warwickshire X 5 April 2004
Derbyshire X X X 10 January 2005
East Lancashire X X 5 April 2004
Essex X X 5 April 2004
Gateshead & South Tyneside X X X 10 January 2005
Hampshire X 5 April 2004
Leicester X 5 April 2004
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute X X X 10 January 2005
Shropshire X 5 April 2004
Somerset X X 5 April 2004
Suffolk X 5 April 2004
1.3.3 The timing of randomisation and the interpretation of the
treatment effect
The experiment was designed such that individuals would be randomly assigned to
the action or control group at the time of ND25+ entry.4 In practical terms, this
means that individuals find out at this stage whether they will be required to
participate in IAP or whether any participation will be voluntary. From this point on,
it is conceivable that the mandate will have an effect. In other words, the effect of
mandating participation may be that individuals change their behaviour before the
intended IAP participation as well as during/after such participation. This influences
4 The description in this section relates to the design of the experiment. In practice,
the experiment was not always implemented as planned.
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how the estimated treatment effect should be viewed; it is the effect of changing
from voluntary to mandatory IAP participation. It is important to be clear on this. The
estimated effect is not simply an estimate of the effect of IAP participation. This is for
two reasons: first, the effect can operate through those who do not participate
(perhaps the requirement to participate encourages them to leave JSA or to find a
job); second, those in the control group can still participate.
Designing the evaluation in this way allows for anticipation effects of the mandate
to be observed from the point of ND25+ entry onwards. In principle, it is possible
that such effects could occur at any stage of the JSA spell if people knew they would
have to participate in IAP at some stage. If this were the case, randomisation should
take place at the beginning of the JSA spell. However, the literature on anticipatory
effects shows (e.g. Bergemann et al. 2005, Ashenfelter 1978, Heckman et al. 1999)
that anticipation effects typically occur shortly before the treatment (and increase
closer to the treatment). Consequently, it seems unlikely that individuals would
change their behaviour in response to a treatment that – if ever started – would
begin about 22 months into their JSA claim until nearer the time of the treatment.
Furthermore, discussions with DWP have revealed that individuals are typically first
informed about IAP when they enter ND25+ rather than at the start of their JSA
claim. Providing additional information to individuals at the time of the start of their
JSA claim therefore risks introducing the sort of randomisation bias discussed in
Chapter 3.
1.4 Aim and structure of this report
This report serves two broad purposes. First, it is intended to document the
approach to the evaluation. This includes a description of how the evaluation was
designed and a discussion of the merits of the approach adopted and the possible
associated pitfalls. Second, the report aims to present some preliminary results.
Since it is an interim report, the results must be regarded as indicative and fuller
results will become available later. As much as anything, they highlight the need for
further results based on the completed pilot data. This indeed will be the chief
purpose of the subsequent final report.
In terms of chapters, the approach to the evaluation is covered in Chapters 1 and 2
while the interim results are presented in Chapters 3 and 4. However, Chapter 3 also
highlights some of the implementation issues that have arisen in the course of the
evaluation and so goes some way to bridging the gap between the design of the
experiment and its implementation. Chapter 5 concludes.
Introduction
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2 Evaluation method
This chapter presents a discussion of issues relating to the experimental approach
adopted for this evaluation. In view of the rarity of such evaluations in the UK, such
a discussion provides useful context.
2.1 The evaluation problem and approaches to solving it
The aim of evaluation is to assess the impact of a treatment. This treatment can be
broadly defined; in the case of the evaluation considered in this report, ‘treatment’
means being mandated to participate in Intensive Activity Period (IAP) (rather than
necessarily participating in IAP). To really know the impact of a treatment requires
comparing the outcomes of those exposed to the treatment with the outcomes that
they would have experienced had they not been exposed to the treatment. By
definition, this counterfactual experience is impossible to observe; for those
exposed to the treatment, only the outcome associated with treatment can be
observed.
To attempt to address this fundamental difficulty, a number of methods are
available. These vary in the assumptions they make – and therefore in their credibility
– but all share the property that they attempt to estimate the counterfactual
outcome for the treated using the outcomes of non-treated. At this stage, it is
helpful to give an example to show how such comparisons can be misleading.
Consider the case of a hypothetical training course for the unemployed. Participation
in this course is voluntary. We might imagine that those who choose to participate
will differ in some ways from those who do not do so. Perhaps they are more
motivated, for example. Some time later, we observe that the proportion in work is
higher among those who participated in the course than it is among those who did
not participate in the course. Can the difference reliably be attributed to the effect of
the course? The answer to this is almost certainly no; since those who participated
are more motivated than those who did not participate, we would expect a higher
proportion to be in work regardless of whether they had in fact participated in the
course.
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As indicated in Chapter 1, Random Assignment (RA) solves this problem by ensuring
that there is no systematic difference between those in the treated group and those
in the non-treated group. This means that the outcome of those in the non-treated
group can reliably be viewed as an estimate of the counterfactual outcome. Any
differences in outcomes following the date of random assignment can be attributed
to the treatment. As recently described by Greenberg and Morris (2005) for the
British Employment Retention and Advancement demonstration project (ERA),
random assignment and experimental evaluation of programmes 'produce
considerably more reliable estimates of programme impacts than any other method
of estimating impacts'.
Non-experimental estimators are the alternative to RA. These are distinguished by
the assumptions they make to estimate the counterfactual. Some of the common
non-experimental estimators are summarised briefly below:
• Matching estimators are possible when all the sources of differences between
treated and non-treated individuals can be observed. Essentially, a group of
non-treated individuals who are similar in all important respects to the treated
individuals is identified and their outcomes are regarded as an estimate of the
counterfactual outcome for the treated. The assumption in this case is that all
important differences are observed; this can sometimes be difficult to justify.
• Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators are possible when longitudinal data
(or cross-section data over two or more time periods) are available. The broad
idea is that the bias that arises when comparing outcomes of the treated group
with those of the non-treated group can be identified by carrying out an analogous
comparison before the introduction of the treatment and then used to correct
the post-treatment comparison. The assumption in this case is that the bias is
constant over time.
• Instrumental variables (IV) estimators are possible when a variable exists – an
‘instrument’ – that is related to participation but not outcomes. In fact, RA can
be viewed as an extreme form of an IV estimator, where the assignment to
action or control group is the instrument. With IV estimators, the key difference
is that the instrument does not determine treatment, it only influences it. IV
estimators account for this weaker relationship in constructing a counterfactual
outcome for those induced to participate due to the instrument. The key difficulty
with this approach is finding a suitable instrument. Also, the effect that is identified
applies only to those induced to participate due to the instrument.
• Control function estimators control for the fact that there are some unobserved
characteristics (motivation in the earlier example) that influence participation
but also influence outcomes. As with the IV approach, an instrument is needed
for a credible application. Also, an assumption regarding the distribution of
unobserved characteristics is needed.
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It is not the purpose of this discussion to provide a comprehensive account of
evaluation methods – this is provided in, for example, Heckman et al. (1999). The key
point to observe is that, whereas RA can provide estimates without having to make
any assumptions, the same is not true of non-experimental estimators. The
importance of this should not be underplayed; although progress continues to be
made with non-experimental approaches, detailed investigations show that they
are generally unable to reproduce the benchmark experimental results (for example,
Heckman et al., 1988).
2.2 Considerations when assessing microeconometric
evaluations
The message from the previous section is that experiments are superior to any non-
experimental method. In this section, possible problems facing evaluations in
general are discussed. Points specific to experiments and to this particular evaluation
are considered in more depth. Possible threats to the validity of the results are
grouped into two broad headings: internal validity (the extent to which it is possible
to view the results as capturing a true causal effect for those included in the
evaluation) and external validity (the extent to which it is possible to generalise from
the results beyond those included in the evaluation).
2.2.1 Internal validity
An evaluation is said to be internally valid if it can provide estimates that can be
regarded as causal. In other words, internal validity implies that we can truly estimate
the effect of the treatment. The discussion so far has suggested that experimental
estimates are internally valid. Generally, threats to the internal validity of experiments
do exist. Most commonly discussed in the economics literature is the idea of
imperfect compliance such as individuals dropping out of treatment. In the case of
this evaluation, dropping-out is a valid outcome. In terms of the earlier discussion, it
can be viewed as a type of anticipation effect. In view of this, it poses no threat to the
internal validity of the experiment.
A direct implication of internal validity is that characteristics are balanced (i.e. similar)
across the treated and non-treated groups. The degree of balance for observable
characteristics can be tested (see Section 3.4.2). Any significant differences would
be a cause for concern. For obvious reasons, the degree of balance for unobservable
characteristics cannot be tested but should result automatically from the RA process.
2.2.2 External validity
An evaluation is externally valid if its findings can be generalised from the study
population to the population at large. It is important to consider the issue of external
validity when generalising the results of any evaluation of a piloted intervention.
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One indicator of external validity is the extent to which pilot areas are similar to non-
pilot areas. If pilot areas are structurally different from non-pilot areas we might
expect the findings from the pilot areas to be less relevant to other areas. A
generalisation of the evaluation results may still be achieved in this case but may
require some adjustment to reflect the difference in characteristics. The descriptive
statistics in Section 3.3.1 compare pilot and non-pilot areas in terms of their
observable characteristics to provide some insight into this.
Another particular potential difficulty when considering the effect of mandating a
hitherto voluntary programme is that the voluntary programme may differ across
pilot and non-pilot areas. Since the evaluation results provide the effect of
mandatory, relative to a voluntary, IAP participation in the pilot areas, they can only
be generalised if the treatment of voluntary IAP participants is the same in pilot and
non-pilot areas. Section 3.4.3 analyses differences in the types of treatment offered
to voluntary participants in the pilot areas and to participants in non-pilot areas.
There are two possible reasons why such differences may be observed:
1 The pilot areas may offer IAP options different from those in the non-pilot areas
in general, i.e. irrespective of the pilots. In this case, the IAP options started by
action and control group members in the pilot areas will be similar, but will
differ from all other areas.
2 The larger number of IAP participants in pilot areas may affect the quality of the
IAP options available to both treatment and control groups in the pilot areas. If
the total number of options available or the funding and the supply of these
options do not increase accordingly, the experiment itself changes the
participation pattern of both action and control groups in the pilot areas relative
to non-pilot areas.
It is also possible that treatments will have macroeconomic effects that are not
captured by a microeconometric evaluation. These could include:
• displacement effects – treated individuals gain jobs rather than non-treated
individuals;
• deadweight effects – subsidising a treatment, which would have occurred anyway;
• substitution effects – treated individuals gain jobs previously held by non-treated
individuals because of relative wage changes;
• general equilibrium effects – the treatment increases the supply of labour and so
downward pressure is exerted on wages;
• tax effects – the effects of financing labour market interventions.
It is difficult to predict in advance the degree to which these will change the extent
to which the estimated effects are scalable to the broader economy. In principle, for
example, displacement or substitution effects could offset any positive effects that
may be shown by the experiment. However, such effects are more likely to be
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important if a programme becomes large in size (Speckesser, 2004). With the
intervention considered in this evaluation, it seems unlikely that such macroeconomic
effects will be very important since the number of individuals affected by the
treatment is small.
While the points raised in this section so far relate equally to experimental and non-
experimental evaluations, Björklund and Regner (1996) identify four types of bias
unique to experiments. These are discussed below in turn along with a consideration
of their relevance to this evaluation.
1 Experiments can give rise to ‘randomisation bias’ whereby the existence of the
experiment influences the behaviour of those potentially eligible for it. With the
mandatory IAP evaluation, this might manifest itself in eligible Jobseekers
Allowance (JSA) claimants opting to terminate their claims early rather than
participate in the experiment. This would mean that both treatment and control
groups included in the experiment would no longer be representative of the
target group of eligible JSA claimants and so the estimated effects would be
similarly unrepresentative. Since individuals only find out about the RA process
at the time of randomisation, it seems unlikely that such bias will result in the
case of this evaluation.
2 The fact of participating in an experiment can influence outcomes. ‘Hawthorne’
effects describe changes in behaviour of action and control groups that result
simply from being involved in an experiment. For example, participants in the
experiment may increase their search efforts purely due to the extra attention
paid to them. ‘Rosenthal’ effects describe the situation where the existence of
an experiment leads the action group to perform better simply because they are
expected to do so (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). With the mandatory IAP
pilots, it is conceivable that both Hawthorne effects and Rosenthal effects could
exist. However, one might hope that the size of any such effect is minimised due
to the fact that, after the initial randomisation, there is no monitoring observable
to members of the action and control groups so that they are not reminded of
fact of their participation on an ongoing basis.
3 Experiments can also influence the behaviour of those delivering the programme.
For example, caseworkers may be selective in who they include in the experiment
in a way that was not intended when the experiment was designed. They might
also alter the type of treatment provided. With the mandatory IAP pilots, advisers
have, in principle, the opportunity to alter the experiment along these lines. The
results presented in Chapter 3 show that there are indeed deviations from the
intended design of the experiment that are consistent with such an ‘adviser
effect’, although it is important to note that there may be other reasons for the
observed deviations from the design. Whatever the cause, the consequence is
that care must be exercised when generalising the results.
4 Finally, caseworkers may allocate those in the control group to an alternative
programme that is a close substitute for the treatment received by those in the
action group. With the mandatory IAP evaluation, such ‘substitution bias’ appears
unlikely since the control group can still participate in IAP on a voluntary basis.
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2.2.3 The ‘black box’ problem
Aside from the issues of internal and external validity, there is the fundamental issue
of how an effect arises. In the case of the mandatory IAP evaluation, for example,
while the existence of an effect on, say, employment may be identified, it is not
possible to say which element of the treatment is causing the effect. For this reason,
the effects estimated by microeconomic evaluations represent something of a ‘black
box’ (see Greenberg and Morris (2005) for discussion of this in the context of the
ERA project). Although this limitation is typically cited with respect to experimental
evaluations, it is equally relevant when considering other microeconometric
approaches. The results of the qualitative evaluation study will be important in
understanding on how the identified effect estimated arises.
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3 Characteristics of the
customer group
The main focus of this chapter is a description of the characteristics of the customer
group and their New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) experiences. A comparison across pilot
areas and non-pilot areas provides an insight into the issue of external validity.
Internal validity is assessed by comparing action and control group members in the
pilot areas. Before this, however, the data are described.
3.1 Evaluation databases
3.1.1 RA tool data
At the beginning of the Gateway, eligible customers participate in an initial
interview in which they are randomly assigned to either the action or the control
group. Random assignment (RA) is carried out using software developed by
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) specifically for this evaluation. We refer
to this as the RA ‘tool’. As well as performing the assignment, the RA tool also
requires customers to provide information on a number of personal characteristics.
These data provide a useful means of checking that the experiment is running as
planned; PSI has produced monthly reports throughout the pilot period demonstrating
that there are no worrying differences between the action and control groups in
terms of their observable characteristics.
The RA tool data cover the period from April 2004 until end October 2005. For
reasons of timing, this report is based on data until the end of August 2005 – a total
number of 2,622 participants. Sub-section 3.3.2 describes the characteristics of the
customers based on the RA tool data. Sub-section 3.4.2 provides tests for internal
validity based on the RA tool data.
Characteristics of the customer group
20
3.1.2 Merged RA tool data/ND25+ data
The RA tool data can be merged with the New Deal evaluation database (NDED). The
NDED data are updated regularly, but do not include the most recent participants.
Due to the reporting and data processing of the NDED, it has a lag of between six
and eight weeks relative to the RA tool data. Therefore, the data used in this report
cover only the period April 2004 until June 2005.5
The NDED data contain all customers’ spells on ND25+. They report the beginning of
the different stages on ND25+ (Gateway, Intensive Activity Period (IAP) (including
type of option) and Follow-through) as well as the most important outcome
variables (date of leaving the programme and destination state). All results reported
in Chapter 5 of this report make use of NDED data. Since the merged data should
cover all participants as recorded in the RA tool data until 24 June 2005, it should
correspond to 2,305 individuals. However, some quality problems restrict the
useable size of the merged data:
• 87 participants in the experiment (3.7% of the total) have no corresponding
spell in the NDED data beginning after April 2004, i.e. there were no records
found in NDED for their identifier.
• For another 28 participants (1.2%), the date of the ND25+ marker was set after
the date of random assignment. Since the marker is the beginning of the ND25+
process and all further activity follows from it, random assignment should not
have taken place for these cases.
• In the merged RA tool/NDED, we often observe that the Gateway began earlier
than the day of random assignment. This indicates that advisers were not acting
according to the guidance of the experiment. In some cases, random assignment
was implemented immediately before the beginning of the options. Since we
only observe effects from the time after random assignment onwards, this means
that, for such cases, we cannot capture any effects that might appear during the
Gateway. To keep the population of customers beginning mandatory IAP25+
relatively consistent, it was decided by DWP only to include customers who begin
the Gateway no more than 28 days before the date of random assignment.
Consequently, all cases with a random assignment earlier than this were excluded
(129 participants – six per cent).
After these exclusions, 2,061 participants in the merged RA tool/NDED remain (89
per cent of the total number of participants). The analyses in Section 3.4.4 are based
on these cases.
5 The latest release of these data should allow us to observe NDED information up
to the end of August 2005. However, these data also require some corrections
and the latest release of these data were supplied after the empirical analysis of
this report was completed.
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3.1.3 ND25+ customer data/NDED data
The third database used in this evaluation is a complete extract of all ND25+
customer records as recorded in the NDED. These data are used for the identification
of the eligible customer group within and outside the pilot areas and for tests on the
external validity of the experiment.
ND25+ customer data cover the period between June 1998 and May 2005, and
provide data for all customers participating in the programme and their outcomes.
Due to the size of the data (789,985 records), the analysis will be restricted to
customers of the age-group 50 – 59 for the financial years 2003/4 and 2004/5.
These data will be analysed for two reasons:
• Only ND25+ data allow the description of important observable characteristics
of the customer group in pilot and non-pilot areas. Such a comparison is very
important for testing the external validity of the experiment; if the characteristics
between pilot and non-pilot areas differ considerably, external validity may not
hold.
• ND25+ data are used for verification of the customer data provided by the RA
tool. ND25+ customer data allow a complete description of the customers in the
pilot areas and reveal whether all customers beginning Gateway have actually
been randomly assigned if belonging to the eligible population.
The disadvantage of the databases used in this evaluation is the different reporting
periods of the three sources. We cannot consistently relate all analyses of this interim
report to the same calendar time. For the final report, data covering equivalent time
periods should be provided to allow a systematic analysis of all different aspects of
this analysis. A summary of the data sources is given in
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Data used for the evaluation
RA tool data Merged RA/NDED ND25+ customer
data NDED data
Observations All participants in NDED spell related to All spells of customers
the experiment entry participation in beginning ND25+ since
experiment (after April 1998
2004)
Main variables Data generated by Data generated by Data generated by Job
DWP implementing Jobcentres (status on Centres (ND25+/
random assignment ND25+ and IAP50+/ IAP50+/destination
(qualification/age/ destination after end after end of
ethnicity/sex/area/ of programme/ programme/ethnicity/
other characteristics) ethnicity/sex/age/other sex/age/other
characteristics) characteristics) for all
spells on ND25+
Period covered April 2004- April 2004- June 1998-
October 2005 August 2005 May 2005
Updates Monthly Monthly -
Latest release with
data up to October 2005 August 2005 May 2005
Data used in this report
up to August 2005 June 2005 May 2005
Number of participants
(Data used in this report) 2,622 2,061 769,985
3.2 Projected customers inflows
When designing the pilots, it was important to have an estimate of the likely size of
the study sample. Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) claimant data for the period May
2002 – May 2003 showed 2,928 individuals aged 50 – 59 passing the threshold of
18 months continuous JSA receipt in the pilot areas over this period. Based on these
figures, roughly 6,000 customers were expected to participate in the experiment
over the period of two years.6 This is shown in the first column of Table 3.2.
In practice, the number of participants in the experiment was much smaller than
expected. We observe 2,567 customer entries until the end of August 2005, of
which 2,296 were resident in non – Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA)
areas and 271 in ERA areas. Based on these observed customer entries, the
prediction of customers until the end of the experiment (31 December 2006 in ERA-
areas, 31 March 2006 in all other areas) remains far below the number originally
expected (Table 3.2, column two). By scaling up the customer inflows achieved until
August 2005, we currently expect that the experiment will have a total number of
participants of less than 4,100 by the end of the pilots.
6 Although this disregarded the fact that only those for whom this was the first
ND25+ spell aged 50+ are eligible for the experiment.
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Table 3.2 shows that there are important regional differences of the size of the
realised customer group relative to the original expectation:
• in five areas the size of customer group corresponds very well to the original
expectation: Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon & Taff; Buckinghamshire and
Oxfordshire; Coventry and Warwick; East Lancashire; and Hampshire. This can
be seen by comparing the projection in column 4 of Table 3.2 with the first
column of observed JSA spells exceeding the duration of 18 months. For example,
in Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon & Taff, a total of 206 participants are expected
compared to the original expectation of 170 participants (85 a year for two
years).
• in some areas, there are fewer participants than expected. This is especially the
case in Calderdale and Kirklees, Gateshead and South Tyneside and Shropshire.
In Calderdale and Kirklees, only 83 customers have so far participated, despite
the relevant inflow to eligibility being 192 in the year before the experiment
began.
The RA tool data do not provide evidence whether the unexpected drop in the size
of the customer group arises from a declining customer group in these areas or
whether some eligible customers are not being randomised. However, there are
some indications for implementation problems in these areas:
• Sub-section 3.3.2 shows that many customers within the pilot areas are not
included in the RA tool data, despite the ND25+ data showing that they should
have been.
• Sub-section 3.4.1 shows that in one area – Calderdale and Kirklees – the majority
of participants in the experiment were randomly assigned after the beginning of
their Gateway. Obviously, implementation may differ across areas and problems
might appear more often in some areas than in others. This might help explain
why some areas have many fewer customers than expected.
Table 3.2 has been regularly updated during the course of the experiment to identify
possible implementation problems. The projected number of participants has
declined only slightly over time. Therefore, a total of about 4,000 customer entries
until the end of the experiment is a reasonable expectation.
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Table 3.2 Projected and achieved number of participants
Annual 18 month Number of Projected Predicted
threshold flow participants until end of until end
(05/02-05/03) – RA data experiment as % of
achieved 18-months
04/04(01/05) – threshold
31/08/05 for two
years
Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon, Taff 85  145 206 121
Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 163  250 355 109
Calderdale and Kirklees 192  83 118 31
Coventry and Warwick 218  295 419 96
Derbyshire* 355  124 373 52
East Lancashire 107  158 224 105
Essex 378  384 545 72
Gateshead and South Tyneside* 278  78 234 42
Hampshire 236  324 460 97
Leicester 356  381 541 76
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyle &
Bute* 167  69 207 62
Shropshire 115  72 102 44
Somerset 92  75 107 58
Suffolk 186  129 183 49
Total non-ERA pilot areas 2,128 2,296 3,261 77
Total 2,928 2,567 4,075 70
N.B. Area missing for 55 cases of the RA tool data (as of August 2005, N=2,622,)
* ERA areas started on 10 January 2005
Scaling factors (based on data until 31 August 2005)
Non-ERA 1.42 (730 days/514 days)
ERA 3.00 (730 days/243 days)
Source: JSA data supplied by DWP and RA tool data until 31 August 2005
3.3 Descriptive analysis of the customer group
3.3.1 Comparing pilot and non-pilot areas
This section describes all customers who were aged 50-59 and who were beginning
their first Gateway after the pilots began. The description is based on ND25+ data
for the period 5 April 2004 to 27 May 2005 for the non-ERA areas and 10 January
2005 to 27 May 2005 for the ERA areas.
Table 3.3 shows a total of 14,854 customers: 2,945 in the pilot areas and 11,909 in
other areas. The regional information was taken from the NDED rather than the RA
tool data. Seven customers of the experimental sample are reported to live outside
the pilot areas; these customers might have moved out of the area after random
assignment. The experimental group that could be retrieved in the ND25+ data until
the end of May 2005 consists of 1,925 customers. 1,020 clients who should have
been randomly assigned did not take part in the experiment (column 3). There are
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substantial differences between the pilot areas: Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire,
Essex and Leicestershire show the lowest shares of customers starting Gateway
without random assignment with around 20 per cent. For Calderdale and Kirklees,
this figure is 57 per cent - this is consistent with the discussion in section 3.2.
Table 3.3 Eligible customers, in pilot and non-pilot areas
Jobcentre district              Experimental groups Number of Share of Local Total
Number Number customers customers area customers
of of without without as %
customers customers random RA (%) of
Action Control assignment total
group group
All non-pilot areas 3 4 11,902 100 80 11,909
Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon,
Taff 67 29 82 46 1 178
Buckinghamshire &
Oxfordshire 103 103 52 20 2 258
Calderdale & Kirklees 29 25 73 57 1 127
Coventry & Warwickshire 121 99 95 30 2 315
Derbyshire 33 37 33 32 1 103
East Lancashire 56 73 79 38 1 208
Essex 166 146 81 21 3 393
Gateshead & South Tyneside 24 17 41 50 1 82
Hampshire 116 94 185 47 3 395
Leicestershire 159 174 84 20 3 417
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde,
Argyll & Bute 12 18 46 61 1 76
Shropshire 25 41 24 27 1 90
Somerset 32 27 57 49 1 116
Suffolk 54 45 88 47 1 187
Total 1,000 932 12,922 100 14,854
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data (Non-
ERA areas: 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005, ERA areas 10 January 2005 – 27 May 2005)
Table 3.3 also provides important information about the validity of the experimental
estimates for other areas: pilot areas account for only 20 per cent of the population
of interest. Comparisons presented in the next sub-section show significant
differences between pilot and non-pilot areas with respect to some characteristics.
As already noted, this may have implications for the external validity of the
experimental estimates.
We can also compare customers in pilot and non-pilot areas who are beginning the
Gateway after the start of the pilots using data from the NDED until 27 May 2005.7
7 Note that the distinction between pilot and non-pilot areas is time-varying, as
the ERA pilot areas start on 10 January 2005. These areas are treated as non-
pilot areas for the earlier period.
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Tests for the significance of these differences are implemented using standard
t-tests.
Table 3.4 shows the gender difference between the areas. In pilot areas, 27 per cent
of all eligible participants on the Gateway are female. The share of women is slightly
higher in non-pilot areas (28 per cent) but the difference in the sample means is not
significantly different from zero.
Table 3.4 Eligible customers in pilot and non-pilot areas, by sex
Pilot area (Col. %) Non-pilot area (Col. %) Difference (%points)
Male 73 72 1
Female 27 28 -1
Base 2,945 11,909
* significant >= 95%
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data (Non-
ERA areas: 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005, ERA areas 10 January 2005 – 27 May 2005)
Table 3.5 compares the age distribution of participants. Some significant differences
are evident: in non-pilot areas, there are significantly more participants in the age
groups 50 – 53. Pilot areas show higher shares of participants aged 54 or 55 at the
beginning of the Gateway. A significantly higher age of participants in pilot areas
might be important when considering the external validity of the results. One might
expect that older participants are less likely to benefit from IAP. For example, the
benefits of re-training are reduced for those with fewer economically productive
years ahead of them. Another possibility is that older participants might be more
likely than younger participants to respond to the treatment by retiring. Clearly, such
differences between the pilot and non-pilot areas could mean that the effects of
mandating IAP could differ in other areas of the UK.
Table 3.5 Eligible customers in pilot and non-pilot areas, by age
Pilot area (Col. %) Non-pilot area (Col. %) Difference (%points)
50 12 16 -4*
51 11 13 -2*
52 10 11 -1
53 10 10 0*
54 10 9 1*
55 11 8 3*
56 10 9 1
57 10 9 1
58 8 8 1
59 7 6 0
Base 2,945 11,909
* significant >= 95%
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data
(Non-ERA areas: 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005, ERA areas 10 January 2005 – 27 May 2005)
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Table 3.6 shows that the pilot areas differ also in the distribution of ethnic groups.
The overall picture shows that 89 per cent of all Gateway participants in the pilot
areas are of British white origin. In other areas, the corresponding figure is 87 per
cent. A difference of two percentage points might not seem large, but it is significant
for the client group of eligible JSA claimants who are or might become subject to a
mandatory IAP. ‘Asian or Asian British’ customers are more common in the pilot
areas than elsewhere while ‘black or black British’ and ‘Chinese or other ethnic
group’ customers are less common.
Table 3.6 Eligible customers in pilot and non-pilot areas, by
ethnicity
Pilot area (Col. %) Non-pilot area (Col. %) Difference (%points)
White 89 87 2*
Mixed 0 0 0
Asian or Asian British 7 4 3*
Black or Black British 1 3 -3*
Chinese or other ethnic
group 1 3 -1*
Prefer not to say 3 3 0
Base 2,945 11,909
* significant >= 95%
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data (Non-
pilot and non-ERA pilot areas: 5 April 2004-27 May 2005, ERA pilot areas 10 January 2005 – 27
May 2005)
The ND25+ data also show that the eligible group in pilot areas has a higher share of
disabled customers than the remaining areas, see Table 3.7. On average, 43 per cent
are disabled in the pilot areas, compared to 39 per cent in non-pilot areas. Again, this
difference of four percentage points is significant.
Table 3.7 Eligible customers in pilot and non-pilot areas, by disability
Pilot area (Col. %) Non-pilot area (Col. %) Difference (%points)
Not disabled 57 62 -4*
Disabled 43 39 4*
Base 2,945 11,909
* significant >= 95%
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data (Non-
pilot and non-ERA pilot areas: 5 April 2004-27 May 2005, ERA pilot areas 10 January 2005 – 27
May 2005)
Table 3.8 shows the differences in the duration of JSA benefit before the beginning
of the ND25+ Gateway. All JSA claimants with a benefit receipt of more than 18
months have to participate in ND25+. Customers in non-pilot areas begin the
Gateway after 18 months, on average. In pilot areas, the mean duration on benefit
for customers is significantly longer. Note that ND25+ should begin after roughly
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546 days. In pilot areas, customers have an average duration on benefit of 609 days,
85 days longer than in non-pilot areas. This difference is significant.
Table 3.8 Eligible customers in pilot and non-pilot areas, by days
on benefit before ND25+
Pilot areas Non-pilot areas
Mean duration Number of Mean Number of Average
of claim customer duration of customer difference
at ND start entries claim at entries (in days)
ND start
ND25+ IAP participants
age group 50-59 609 2,930 524 11,810 85*
* significant >= 95%
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data
(Non-pilot and non-ERA pilot areas: 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005, ERA pilot areas
10 January 2005 – 27 May 2005)
To summarise, most of the previous tables show significant differences between
pilot and non-pilot: customers in pilot areas are older, they less frequently report
disabilities and are more often white. Also, they tend to remain longer on benefit
before entering the Gateway. All these differences may be important when
considering the possible effect of mandating IAP in other areas for this age group.
Any generalisation of the results should take into account that the population of
interest in pilot areas is slightly different from the national average or the non-pilot
areas and so issues of external validity arise. Appropriate measures to address this
might include:
• weighting experimental estimates based on average socioeconomic characteristics
in all areas; and
• carrying out additional non-experimental analyses for specific groups of interest.
3.3.2 The customer group in pilot areas
Following the introduction of the pilots, all customers with a JSA duration of 18
months or more should be randomly allocated to either the action group or the
control group if they are living in a pilot area and start their first ND25+ Gateway
aged 50 – 59.
By selecting all eligible customers whose ND25+ spell begins after the start of the
pilots, the ND25+ data until May 2005 should roughly correspond to the data
provided by the RA tool. However, Table 3.9 shows that a substantial number of
eligible customers in the pilot areas started ND25+ without random assignment;
1,020 customers have no corresponding entries in the RA tool data. Qualitative
research by the project group within DWP shows that there are numerous reasons
why such cases might occur; most importantly customers were not randomly
assigned at the adviser’s discretion, either because they would have turned 60
shortly after beginning their Gateway or because of health reasons that are
unobservable in ND25+ data.
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Table 3.9 shows that the implementation of the experiment matters a lot and that
the advisers have a crucial role in the delivery of the programme. As discussed in
Section 3.2, roughly 3,000 eligible customers per annum were expected when
designing the evaluation (see Table 3.2). Based on data covering the first 13 months
of the experiment, Table 3.9 shows that roughly these numbers of customers are
beginning ND25+ in pilot areas. However, a substantial proportion of eligible
customers do not participate in the experiment.
This is of great importance for the experimental estimates for two reasons:
1 There is no quantitative information on how advisers are selecting individuals.
This creates a problem when attempting to generalise the results.
2 The number of participants available for the quantitative analysis is substantially
reduced. This affects the precision of the estimates reported in the Chapter 4.
Table 3.9 also shows that some of the clients who are randomly assigned would not
be eligible for the programme if the rules of eligibility were consistently applied.
Column two of the table reports that 495 customers (26 per cent of the experimental
group) are not in fact eligible to participate since they have already participated in
ND25+ aged 50 – 59. There are numerous reasons why such ineligible customers
might be included in the experiment. For example, customers might not have
reported their earlier spell. Alternatively, an adviser may have decided to randomly
assign an ineligible individual because an earlier Gateway spell ended after a very
short duration.
Table 3.9 Customers in pilot areas, by eligibility and random
assignment status
Eligible Ineligible  Total
No random assignment 1,020 0 1,020
 Action 735 262 997
 Control 695 233 928
Total 2,450 495 2,945
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data
(Eligible: Customers beginning the first Gateway participation aged 50-59 in pilot areas after the
introduction of mandatory IAP50+ in the period 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005; eligibility in ERA
pilot areas starts 10 January 2005. Ineligible: Customers beginning a second or later start of
Gateway aged 50-59)
Table 3.9 does not control for the duration on JSA before the random assignment.
According to the guidance for the mandatory IAP pilots, customers should only
participate in RA to mandatory IAP if their benefit claim exceeds 546 days at the
starting date of the Gateway. Therefore, some of the ‘eligible’ customers without
RA (as reported in Table 3.9) might not be eligible according to this criterion. Table
3.10 explores this additional restriction on eligibility and reports the duration on JSA
before the beginning of Gateway. If the experiment were implemented according to
the guidance, early entrants would not be randomly assigned.
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Table 3.10 shows that 595 out of 1,020 clients beginning Gateway without RA in
pilot areas should have been randomly assigned as their JSA claim was longer than
546 days at the beginning of the Gateway. It also shows that 288 participants
beginning the Gateway with RA should not have been part of the experiment
because they started ND25+ early.
Given that the experimental sample partially consists of early entrants, this table
provides further evidence that implementation is not wholly consistent with the
formal rules of eligibility, and that the experimental samples obtained differ from the
groups originally expected based on the programme design.
Table 3.10 Customers in pilot areas, by benefit duration and
random assignment status
Length of JSA claim Random assignment
Missing Action Control Total
546+ days 595 846 791 2,232
< 546 days 425 151 137 713
Total 1,020 997 928 2,945
Source: Gateway entrants aged 50-59 with first Gateway after the age of 50, ND25+ data (Early
entrants with less than 546 days on benefit within the last 21 months are not supposed to be
allocated by random; even if they are starting their first participation on the Gateway aged 50-
59)
But is it really a problem that the experimental estimates rely on customers that differ
from those originally planned in the design of the pilots? Not if one takes into
account the importance of practical implementation of the programme. All
programmes in all areas are implemented by advisers. Advisers in other areas might
apply a selective implementation of the programme similar to the one we observe in
the pilot areas. Therefore, a nationwide introduction of mandatory IAP would
presumably lead to similar selection processes in other areas, and the external
validity of the experiment might not be affected by the selective implementation of
the pilots. Should similar selection processes occur elsewhere, estimates based on
the experimental samples provided will still be informative for all areas, because they
show the outcome of a programme as delivered in the local Jobcentres. For this
reason, we do not exclude from subsequent analyses those individuals who are
ineligible due to having previously participated in ND25+ aged 50 or over or to not
having claimed JSA for 18 months.
The remainder of this sub-section describes the characteristics of customers
participating in the experiment between 5 April 2004 and 31 August 2005 using
information collected by the RA tool. Table 3.11 shows the numbers of customers in
the action and control group: a group of 2,622 was randomly assigned over this
period, of which 48 per cent belong to the control group and 52 per cent to the
action group.
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Table 3.11 Customers starting Gateway with random assignment,
pilot areas only
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col %
Action group 1,353 52
Control group 1,269 48
Total 2,622 100
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.12 shows the inflows on a monthly basis. In April 2004, only 90 customers
were randomly assigned to the action and control group. June 2004 shows the
highest number of customer inflows with a total of 196 new clients. Between July
and October 2004, the customer numbers are around 160. There are considerably
fewer new customers in December 2004. As three additional pilots participate in the
experiment after 10 January 2005, the average customer numbers were expected to
increase for 2005. However, Table 3.12 shows little change; after a peak of 193 new
customers in January 2005, numbers return to around 165 a month until the
summer, when slightly fewer customers were randomly assigned: 152 in July 2005
and 123 in August 2005. In May 2005, there are only 121 new customers due to one
week without any random assignments because of staff shortages at DWP.
Table 3.12 Customers starting Gateway, by month of random
assignment
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Apr-04 90 3.4
May-04 133 5.1
Jun-04 196 7.5
Jul-04 159 6.1
Aug-04 150 5.7
Sep-04 159 6.1
Oct-04 167 6.4
Nov-04 188 7.2
Dec-04 123 4.7
Jan-05 193 7.4
Feb-05 165 6.3
Mar-05 167 6.4
Apr-05 167 6.4
May-05 121 4.6
Jun-05 169 6.5
Jul-05 152 5.8
Aug-05 123 4.7
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
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Turning to the socio-economic characteristics of the customer groups, Table 3.13
shows that the customers are predominantly male; 1,965 or 75 per cent of all
participants are men.
Table 3.13 Customers starting Gateway, by sex
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Male 1,965 74.9
Female 657 25.1
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.14 shows the age distribution of the customer group. Only those between
50 and 59 years of age were supposed to be included in the experiment, but 17 of
the participants were outside this range. Participants are spread fairly evenly
throughout the eligible age range, although there is a dip in numbers for those
aged 59.
Table 3.14 Customers starting Gateway, by age at random
assignment
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
49 1 0.0
50 296 11.3
51 288 11.0
52 249 9.5
53 261 10.0
54 290 11.1
55 292 11.1
56 260 9.9
57 271 10.3
58 239 9.1
59 159 6.1
60 5 0.2
61 4 0.2
62 4 0.2
63 3 0.1
Total 2,499 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.15 gives a breakdown of the participants by ethnicity. The key customer
group consists of white British persons with a total share of 86 per cent of all
participants in the experiment, followed by the group of Asian or Asian British
participants with seven per cent of total. Those belonging to other ethnic groups or
who refuse to provide information about their ethnic origin account for seven per
cent of the total.
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Table 3.15 Customers starting Gateway, by ethnicity
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
White – British 2,257 86.1
White – Irish 31 1.2
White – Other 38 1.5
Mixed 6 0.2
Asian or Asian British 195 7.4
Black or Black British 41 1.6
Chinese or other ethnic group 14 0.5
Prefer not to say 40 1.5
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
The pilot areas differ in size. As shown in Table 3.16, more than 50 per cent of the
participants come from the four areas of Coventry and Warwickshire, Essex,
Hampshire and Leicestershire. The biggest share is found for Essex and Leicestershire
(both about 15 per cent) and Hampshire (13 per cent). The three ERA areas
(Gateshead & South Tyneside, Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute and Derbyshire)
began the experiment on 10 January 2005 and show smaller numbers of participants
in general. As suggested by Table 3.2, Derbyshire is the biggest of the later pilots.
Fewer than 100 participants come from each of Somerset, Shropshire and Calderdale
and Kirklees. On the basis of Table 3.2, small numbers were expected for Somerset
and Shropshire at the beginning of the experiment. However, the number of
participants was expected to be higher for Calderdale & Kirklees.
Table 3.16 Customers starting Gateway, by pilot area
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon, Taff 145 5.7
Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 250 9.7
Calderdale & Kirklees 83 3.2
Coventry and Warwickshire 295 11.5
East Lancashire 158 6.2
Essex 384 15.0
Hampshire 324 12.6
Leicester 381 14.8
Shropshire 72 2.8
Somerset 75 2.9
Suffolk 129 5.0
Derbyshire 124 4.8
Gateshead & South Tyneside 78 3.0
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute 69 2.7
Total 2,567 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
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The RA tool also collects detailed information about the customer’s level of
education. Table 3.17 shows that more than half of all customers (51 per cent)
report not having any formal qualification. NVQ level 1 or equivalent is the highest
level of qualification for 11 per cent of participants. Another 12 per cent have GCSEs
or an equivalent qualification. Roughly nine per cent of participants passed A-levels
and 17 per cent hold higher education (i.e. college or university) qualifications.
Table 3.17 Customers starting Gateway, by level of education
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
None 1,331 50.8
NVQ level 1 or equivalent 286 10.9
GCSEs or equivalent 318 12.1
A levels or equivalent 231 8.8
Higher education 456 17.4
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
The RA tool also collects information about the skill level of most recent employment
before the current JSA claim. Table 3.18 shows that the majority of customers used
to work in manual occupations (40 per cent). Roughly 32 per cent were employed as
semi-skilled or skilled blue collar workers and 8 per cent formerly worked in office
jobs. There is also a high share of former professionals or managers among the
clients (20 per cent).
Table 3.18 Customers starting Gateway, by last occupation
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Manual 1,060 40.4
Semi-skilled 409 15.6
Skilled 427 16.3
Office 200 7.6
Professional 274 10.5
Managerial 252 9.6
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.19 shows the partnership status of participants. Only 29 per cent are married
or live in partnerships compared to more than 70 per cent who are either singles (41
per cent), divorced (22 per cent), separated (five per cent) or widowed (three per
cent).
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Table 3.19 Customers starting Gateway, by partnership status
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Single 1,080 41.2
Married 681 26.0
Living together 68 2.6
Divorced 573 21.9
Separated 137 5.2
Widowed 75 2.9
Prefer not to say 8 0.3
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
For customers with a partner, that partner is also unemployed in more than half of all
cases. Only 10 per cent of all customers live with partners who are working.
Table 3.20 Customers starting Gateway, by partner’s employment
status
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
No partner 1,865 71.1
Retired 42 1.6
Working over 30 hours per week 151 5.8
Working between 16 and 30 hours per week 66 2.5
Working less than 16 hours per week 44 1.7
Unemployed - seeking work 74 2.8
Unemployed - not seeking work 325 12.4
Other 37 1.4
Prefer not to say 18 0.7
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.21 shows that the majority (93 per cent) of participants are not working at all
while on JSA.
Table 3.21 Customers starting Gateway, by own employment status
Number of customers until end August 2005 Col. %
Do not work 2,425 92.5
Work for less than 5 hours per week 33 1.3
Work between 5 and 10 hours per week 91 3.5
Work between 10 and 16 hours per week 73 2.8
Total 2,622 100.0
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
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3.4 Randomisation and validity of the experiment
As discussed in the methodological section of this report, random assignment
should have divided the customer groups into a treatment sample and a control
group sample that do not differ with respect to any characteristics so that any
differences in subsequent outcomes can be viewed as being caused by the
treatment. Furthermore, random assignment was supposed to take place at the
time of entering ND25+. This section provides a number of checks:
• a description of the timing of randomisation relative to the date of Gateway
start;
• an exploration of internal validity, i.e. tests on the sample averages of observable
characteristics for action and control groups;
• an exploration of the external validity of the experiment that describes differences
between policies implemented in the pilot and non-pilot areas;
• a comparison of progress through ND25+ for action and control group members
and of the IAP options they participate in.
3.4.1 Timing of randomisation
As already noted, since participants know at the time of random assignment
whether they will later have to enter the IAP, it is possible that the effect of the
mandate may happen before entering IAP. Randomisation should take place at the
date of the initial interview for the ND25+, i.e. at the start of the Gateway. There are
however quite a number of cases where the Gateway begins earlier than the date of
random assignment. On average, 78 per cent of all customers are randomly
assigned on the date of the initial Gateway interview or before, but this varies widely
across areas. Based on data up to 27 June 2005, Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of
customers beginning the Gateway on or after the date of random assignment
relative to participants who were randomly assigned after starting the Gateway.
Random assignment after starting the Gateway contradicts the guidance of the
programme but is commonly observed. This is most obvious in the case of
Calderdale and Kirklees where only 25 per cent of participants are assigned on or
before the beginning of the Gateway. In such cases, the behaviour of those on the
Gateway will be unaffected until randomisation takes place so the scope for the
treatment to have an effect is curtailed.
While Calderdale and Kirklees provides the most extreme example, there are also
substantial numbers of participants randomly assigned late in other areas. In
Hampshire, Somerset and Suffolk, around 25 per cent of all participants start the
Gateway earlier than the random assignment. Other areas are more successful in
implementing the experiment as planned. In Essex, for example, random assignment
is late in only ten per cent of cases.
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Figure 3.1 Timing of Gateway start relative to random
assignment, by area
Late randomisation of participants on the Gateway has important consequences for
the evaluation:
• As mentioned above, variation in the timing of randomisation relative to the
start of Gateway means that the estimated treatment effect is an average: for
some participants, it includes the whole Gateway period, for others only a part
of it.
• Attempting to generalise the results becomes more complicated. The estimated
treatment effect is less likely to correspond to the effect which would be found
if the mandate were introduced nationally since a nationwide implementation
would affect the whole period on ND25+, rather than just the post-randomisation
Gateway as in this evaluation.
3.4.2 Internal validity of the experiment
As already noted, random assignment should create an action and a control group
which are statistically equivalent to each other. By construction, this ‘balance’ is
achieved for both observable and unobservable characteristics. As a check of
whether the experiment has worked, it is helpful to compare the distribution of
observable characteristics across the action and control groups. In the following,
tests of differences are carried out based on data provided by the random
assignment tool.
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Table 3.22 shows the distribution of the action and the control groups sample across
areas. Among the action group, seven per cent of all customers are based in the
district of Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon, Taff, whereas only four per cent of the control
group are resident in this area. This difference is significant as it is for East Lancashire
and Shropshire: participants assigned to the action group are less likely to be
residents in these districts than participants that are allocated to the control group of
the experiment.
Despite this indication that randomisation was not successful with respect to the
geographical distribution across Jobcentres, the problem is unlikely to be serious for
two reasons:
1 these three areas are relatively small in size, accounting for only 15 per cent of all
customers (see Table 3.16). Put another way, the experiment was successful for
85 per cent of customers.
2 related to the first point, since the differences are based on small numbers of
customers it might only be a temporary problem. That is, as the study group
grows in size, the averages between both groups are likely to balance out.
Table 3.22 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by area
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference (%points)
Bridgend & Rhonda, Cynon, Taff 7 4 3*
Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 9 10 -1
Calderdale & Kirklees 3 3 1
Coventry and Warwickshire 12 11 1
East Lancashire 5 7 -2*
Essex 15 15 0
Hampshire 12 13 -1
Leicester 15 15 0
Shropshire 2 4 -1*
Somerset 3 3 0
Suffolk 5 5 0
Derbyshire 5 5 0
Gateshead & South Tyneside 3 3 1
Renfrewshire, Inverclyde,
Argyll & Bute 3 3 0
Base 1,320 1,247
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
As shown in Table 3.23, no significant difference was found in the gender mix
between the action and the control groups. In both samples, roughly 75 per cent of
the participants are male and 25 per cent female.
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Table 3.23 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by sex
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference (%points)
Male 75 75 1
Female 25 25 -1
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.24 shows the ethnicity of the participants. Again, there are no significant
differences between both groups, although there are small differences in the shares
of customers for the group of white British and black British persons.
Table 3.24 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by ethnicity
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in (% points)
White – British 86 86 1
White – Irish 1 1 0
White – Other 1 2 0
Mixed 0 0 0
Asian or Asian British 7 8 0
Black or Black British 2 1 1
Chinese or other ethnic
group 1 0 0
Prefer not to say 1 2 -1
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.25 shows the shares of customers from action and control groups for the
age categories 49 – 63 as observed at the date of random assignment. We observe
differences of up to two percentage points for the age of 51 and 54; 12 per cent of
the action group is 51 years old at the date of random assignment, but only ten per
cent of the control group. However, neither this difference nor a similar difference
for the 54 year old customers is statistically significant.
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Table 3.25 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by age
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in percentage
points
49 0 0 0
50 11 12 -1
51 12 10 2
52 9 10 -1
53 9 10 -1
54 12 10 2
55 11 12 -1
56 10 10 0
57 10 11 -1
58 10 9 1
59 6 6 -1
60 0 0 0
61 0 0 0
62 0 0 0
63 0 0 0
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
As shown in Table 3.26, there are virtually no differences in the partnership status of
the two groups. Exactly the same share of participants in action or control groups are
single, married, divorced or widowed. There are small differences in the share of
cohabiting couples and separated customers; however, none is significant.
Table 3.26 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by marital
status
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in percentage
points
Single 41 41 0
Married 26 26 1
Living together 3 2 1
Divorced 22 22 -1
Separated 5 6 -1
Widowed 3 3 0
Prefer not to say 0 0 0
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
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There are differences in the shares of action and control group participants that
reported the lowest or the highest level of qualification; 52 per cent of those in the
action group have no formal qualifications compared to 49 per cent of the control
group. On the other hand, there is a higher share of highly skilled jobseekers among
control group participants (19 per cent compared to 16 per cent for the action
group). However, none of these differences is statistically significant (Table 3.27).
Table 3.27 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by education
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
None 52 49 3
NVQ level 1 or equivalent 11 11 -1
GCSEs or equivalent 13 11 2
A levels or equivalent 8 10 -2
Higher education 16 19 -3
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.28 illustrates the differences between action and control group with regards
to the last occupation. Again, there are no significant differences between both
groups.
Table 3.28 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by last
occupation
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
Manual 41 40 0
Semi-skilled 16 16 0
Skilled 17 16 1
Office 8 7 2
Professional 10 11 -2
Managerial 9 10 -1
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Tables 3.29 and 3.30 summarise the employment status of participants in action and
control groups as well as their partners’ employment status. Generally, there are
only very small differences between the groups and none is statistically significant.
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Table 3.29 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by
employment status
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
Do not work 93 92 1
Work for less than 5 hours
per week 1 1 0
Work between 5 and 10 hours
per week 3 4 -1
Work between 10 and 16 hours
per week 3 2 1
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
Table 3.30 Differences in characteristics at date of RA, by partner’s
employment status
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
No partner 70 72 -2
Retired 2 1 0
Working over 30 hours per week 5 6 -1
Working between 16 and 30 hours
per week 3 3 0
Working less than 16 hours
per week 2 1 0
Unemployed - seeking work 3 3 0
Unemployed - not seeking work 13 12 2
Other 2 1 0
Prefer not to say 1 1 0
Base 1,353 1,269
* significant >= 95%
Source: Customers’ data allocated by DWP RA tool, until 31 August 2005
As a summary of the tests on internal validity, the randomisation was successful and
balanced almost all observable characteristics between both groups. This provides
some reassurance that the control group is well suited to providing a counterfactual
outcome for the action. The randomisation has not been successful in balancing the
geographical distribution of participants but this is likely to be overcome as the
sample size increases.
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3.4.3 External validity
This section explores whether the estimated treatment effects can be regarded as
externally valid. As shown in Section 3.3.1, there are differences between pilot and
non-pilot areas with respect to the ethnic origin of ND25+ participants, the age
group and the length of the benefit claim before the beginning of the Gateway.
However, the conclusion in Section 3.3.1 was that such differences would not
violate external validity if the results obtained by the experimental estimates are
weighted accordingly.
In this section, we present further tests on the similarity of pilot and non-pilot areas
with respect to the policies implemented, i.e. the time participants spend on the
Gateway and the quality of the IAP options. While it is possible to weight
experimental results to address compositional differences between pilot and non-
pilot areas (as discussed above) it is not possible to proceed in this way when there
are differences between pilot and non-pilot areas in the actual treatment being
delivered. Intuitively, this is obvious – there is no reason to expect two different
treatments to have the same effect.
Table 3.31 compares the time spent on the Gateway before the participation in a
first option between pilot and non-pilot areas. As can be seen in the first row, there
are significantly different durations on the Gateway between pilot and non-pilot
areas even before the introduction of the pilots. In the year 2003/2004, participants
in pilot areas spent 94 days on the Gateway before starting the first option of the IAP
compared to 86 days in the non-pilot areas.
After the beginning of the experiment, the average duration of the Gateway for
participants in IAP is 91 days in the pilot areas and only 71 days in non-pilot areas for
the group of interest; the difference has grown from eight to 20 days. Comparing
the duration on Gateway for voluntary participants, we find that control observations
in pilot areas stay on Gateway for an average of average 93 days before starting an
option versus 71 days in non-pilot areas.
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Table 3.31 Time until first IAP option before and after
introduction of pilots, in pilot areas and non-pilot
areas
Pilot areas Non-pilot areas
Days until Number Days Number Mean
first of until first of difference
Option cases Option cases (in days)
ND25+ IAP participants age
group 50+, April 2003-April 2004 94 645 86 3,763 8*
ND25+ IAP participants age
group 50+, April 2004-May 2005 91 820 71 2,628 20*
ND25+ IAP voluntary** participants
age group 50+, after introduction of
mandatory IAP 93 121 71 2,628 22*
* significant >= 95%
** Voluntary participants in pilot areas are control group customers only
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
Apart from differences in the duration of Gateway, pilot areas also implement
different types of options than non-pilot areas. This pattern can be found before and
after the introduction of the pilots. In pilot areas, 20 per cent of all IAP participants
start Basic Skills/Basic Employability Training as their first option in the financial year
2003/4 compared to 17 per cent in non-pilot areas. Fewer participants begin an
option promoting self-employment in pilot areas and a much higher share of
participants begin a Work Placement Option (25 per cent compared to 19 per cent).
In non-pilot areas, 24 per cent of all IAP participants start a Work Experience option
compared to 19 per cent in pilot areas (see Table 3.32).
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Table 3.32 Differences by type of first IAP option before
introduction of pilots, in pilot areas and non-pilot areas
Non-pilot areas Pilot areas
Total Col. % Total Col. % Percentage
point
difference
Employment Option 415 16 104 16 -1
FTE/training 404 16 96 14 -1
BET/BS Option 434 17 133 20 3*
Self-employment (n. NDFM) 147 6 21 3 -3*
Self-employment (NDFM) 2 0 0 0 0
ETO Option 30 1 13 2 1
Work Placement Option 475 19 166 25 6*
Work Experience Option 610 24 126 19 -5*
IAP training 3 0 2 0 0
Job search Option 6 0 1 0 0
Training for Work 19 1 3 0 0
Work-based Learning 2 0 2 0 0
Total 2,547 100 667 100
* significant >= 95%
Source: ND25+ data for customers aged 50-59, 1 April 2003 – 4 April 2004
These differences in the programmes provided under IAP are more noticeable after
the introduction of the pilots: Table 3.33 shows that a much lower share of IAP
participants in pilot areas begins an employment option (five per cent versus 15 per
cent) than in non-pilot areas and many fewer begin IAP training as their first option
(14 per cent versus 21 per cent). The biggest difference is with work experience
options; these account for 42 per cent of all participants in the pilot areas but only
19 per cent in the non-pilot areas. Overall, these figures indicate that pilot areas
generally carry out different programmes under IAP than non-pilot areas for the
population of interest and that there might be some concern whether external
validity is credible.
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Table 3.33 Differences by type of first IAP option after
introduction of pilots, in pilot areas and non-pilot areas
Non-pilot area Pilot area**
Total Col. % Total Col. % Percentage
point
difference
Employment Option 265 15 32 5 -9*
FTE/training 0 0 0
BET/BS Option 423 23 130 21 -2
Self-employment (not NDFM) 287 16 65 11 -5*
Self-employment (NDFM) 2 0 0 0 0
ETO Option 84 5 9 1 -3*
Work Placement Option 20 1 33 5 4*
Work Experience Option 338 19 253 42 23*
IAP training 386 21 86 14 -7*
Job search Option 12 1 0 0 -1*
Training for Work 4 0 1 0 0
Work-based Learning 1 0 0 0 0
Total 1,822 100 609 100
* significant >= 95%
** ERA areas from January 2005
Source: ND25+ data for customers aged 50-59, 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005
Table 3.34 compares the IAP options of those in the control group in pilot areas with
those in the non-pilot areas. These differences mirror those shown in Table 3.33;
again, the work experience option is much more widely used among voluntary
participants in pilot areas than in non-pilot areas. The fact that this is the only
difference that is statistically significant despite the fact that many of the differences
are similar in size to those in Table 3.33 reflects the smaller sample size available in
Table 3.34.
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Table 3.34 Differences by type of first option after introduction
of mandatory IAP pilots for voluntary customers, pilot
areas and non-pilot areas
Type of Option 1, voluntary customers aged 50+ only+, Period 5 April 2004 - 27 May 2005
Non-pilot areas Pilot areas**
Total Col. % Total Col. % Percentage
point
difference
Employment Option 265 15 4 3 -11
FTE/training
BET/BS Option 423 23 30 25 2
Self-employment (not NDFM) 287 16 13 11 -5
Self-employment (NDFM) 2 0 0 0 0
ETO Option 84 5 3 3 -2
Work Placement Option 20 1 8 7 6
Work Experience Option 338 19 45 38 19*
IAP training 386 21 17 14 -7
Job search Option 12 1 0 0 -1
Training for Work 4 0 0 0 0
Work-based Learning 1 0 0 0 0
Total 1,822 100 120 100
* significant >= 95%
** ERA areas from January 2005
Source: ND25+ data for customers aged 50-59, 5 April 2004 – 27 May 2005 (voluntary custom-
ers in pilot areas correspond to the control group)
These comparisons indicate that there are significant differences between pilot and
non-pilot areas in the type of option implemented and that this might harm external
validity. In particular, differences between pilot and non-pilot areas in the treatment
offered reduce the scope for generalising the results and may mean that the effects
estimated in this evaluation would not apply to all areas but only those implementing
IAP in a similar way to the pilot areas.
3.4.4 Participation on ND25+
This section describes participation in the programme for action and control groups
as recorded in the merged RA/NDED data until the 27 June 2005. As the experiment
is still ongoing, the time period observed following the date of random assignment
varies for all customers. In this sub-section, we trace progress through ND25+ from
the point of random assignment onwards. Those who became participants in April
2004 can be observed for up to 413 days. Consequently, consideration of longer
term outcomes is based on a smaller number of participants than is consideration of
shorter term outcomes.
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Figure 3.2 shows the numbers of participants that can be observed for different
durations following RA. As described in Table 3.1, there are 2,061 participants in the
merged RA/NDED data for which we can observe the outcomes following RA, but
outcomes can only be observed for three weeks post RA for the entire sample. All
descriptions related to later dates and outcomes for periods longer than one month
are based on a subset of the sample, which can be observed for the corresponding
duration. Figure 3.2 shows that 1,748 are observed for at least 105 days after RA.
After a year, roughly 500 participants remain in the sample. Descriptions of
participation and outcomes 59 weeks (413 days) after RA use a sample of only 235
participants, i.e. only 11 per cent of the total sample and only those who started
Gateway in April and May 2004.
Figure 3.2 Number of participants observable at specific times post
random assignment
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the programme status of the action and control groups
beginning the Gateway in pilot areas by RA status based on the merged RA/NDED
data for up to 60 weeks after RA. Outcomes are related to the end of these weeks
rather than to weekly averages and the time axis shows days following RA instead of
weeks. The columns of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the destination states of the
participants in the action and control groups respectively.
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Figure 3.3 shows the participation and outcomes of the action group. Seven days
after RA, most are on the Gateway, only 0.5 per cent of these customers have left
ND25+ to unsubsidised employment and about one per cent to an alternative
benefit. After several weeks, the share of customers leaving the programme
increases as well as the number of customers beginning the IAP or leaving to any
alternative benefit. After nine weeks (63 days), 75 per cent of the action group are
still on the Gateway, but seven per cent have left to employment and another seven
per cent have started a first option. After 35 weeks (245 days), 11 per cent are still on
the Gateway, although they should have started the IAP after four months. There
are still 11 per cent on the first option at this date, while some 18 per cent have left
the programme to unsubsidised employment. Those completing ND25+ return to
regular signing after they finished the IAP. Eight per cent of all action group
participants show this outcome. At the end of the period of observation – about 59
weeks after random assignment – we observe a small group of three per cent
remaining on the Gateway, however most of the customers have participated in the
programme and show programme-related outcomes. There is a one per cent share
of participants still on options, while five per cent are on the follow-through. 22 per
cent have left the programme to unsubsidised employment, 14% claim an
alternative benefit and another 22 per cent have returned to regular pattern of
signing for JSA.
Figure 3.3 Programme status on ND25+ and outcomes, 0-60
weeks after RA, action group
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Figure 3.4 shows the programme status and outcomes for the control group. As
participation in IAP is voluntary for this group, fewer participants from the control
group are expected to participate in the IAP stage. This indeed appears to be the
case; participation in the IAP is less common than for the action group. After 133
days (19 weeks), only nine per cent participate in IAP compared to 22 per cent of the
action group (Figure 3.3). This difference remains almost constant for 10 weeks.
During the first 11 weeks following RA, both groups show very similar employment
outcomes with up to eight per cent leaving the programme to unsubsidised
employment. After that, participants of the control group have lower shares of
participants leaving the programme to unsubsidised employment;
37 weeks after RA, 15 per cent of the control group have left to unsubsidised
employment compared to 20 per cent of the action group.
As there is no mandatory participation on IAP, participants in the control group
return to the regular pattern of signing directly after the Gateway if they remain on
JSA, and there are very few participants observed on the follow through stage of
ND25+ as this stage is related to previous IAP participation. As expected, there are
many more participants leaving the programme to return to regular signing among
the control group than among the action group; 175 days after random assignment,
11 per cent of the control group have left ND25+ to return to regular signing for JSA
compared to only four per cent of the action group.
Figure 3.4 Programme status on ND25+ and outcomes, 0-60 weeks
after RA, control group
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Based on the descriptions of Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we summarise the following:
• Most participants of both groups leave the Gateway within seven months after
random assignment; ten per cent of participants remain on the Gateway for a
much longer duration.
• The share of participants in IAP is much bigger for the action group than for the
control group. Selection into the action group increased the IAP participation as
planned and postponed the return to regular signing for JSA for this group
relative to the control group.
• The employment outcomes are different for both groups, and the action group
shows a higher share of participants starting unsubsidised employment after
randomisation than the control group. Chapter 5 explores this in more detail.
Table 3.35, shows that the duration of the Gateway for participants in options
differs between action and control groups. While those in the action group show an
average duration of 113 days, the mean duration is only 93 days for the control
group beginning IAP. It is possible that this difference arises since control group
members only volunteer for IAP if they believe it will help them find work. With this
potential benefit in mind, they might actively press their ND25+ adviser to enter IAP
as soon as possible.
Table 3.35 Time until first IAP option, by RA status
Action group Control group
Mean duration on Gateway at date of Random assignment (in days) 113 93
Number of participants on (until end June 2005) 310 121
Difference significant >= 95%
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
Table 3.36 shows the extent to which the type of the options started by the action or
the control group differ. A significant difference in the take up of work experience
options is evident; more than half of the action group have first start an option of this
type compared to only 38 per cent for the control group. The proportion starting
self-employment or basic skills options is lower in the action group than the control
group but these differences are not statistically significant.
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Table 3.36 Differences by type of first option, by RA status
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
Employment Option 2 3 -1
BET/BS Option 17 25 -7
Self-Employment (not NDFM) 6 11 -5
ETO Option 2 2 -1
Work Placement Option 7 7 0
Work Experience Option 51 38 13*
IAP Training 15 14 0
Base 310 121 0
* significant >= 95%
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
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4 Evaluation results
This chapter presents preliminary estimates of the effects of mandating Intensive
Activity Period (IAP) in the pilot areas. Since the piloting stage of the evaluation has
not been completed at the time of writing, the results are necessarily of an interim
nature. Fuller results will follow in the final report for this evaluation.
An important caveat to the results is that they consider only the immediate
destination on leaving New Deal 25 plus (ND25+) and do not allow for the possibility
that individuals change their status after this time. For example, a proportion of
those entering unsubsidised employment, will later return to Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JSA). On the other hand, a proportion of those returning to regular signing after
ND25+ will later find work. Not allowing for these post-exit changes may result in
overstating estimated effects. In view of this, the true effect of the treatment on the
probability of an individual having a particular economic status at a given time after
random assignment is likely to be smaller than the results presented in this chapter.
Consequently, the results should be interpreted with care. For the final report, it will
be important to address this shortcoming in the data.
This chapter examines the effects of mandating IAP in three separate ways. First, and
most intuitive, simple outcomes estimates are provided by comparing average
outcomes among those in the treatment group with average outcomes among
those in the control group. Second, analogous estimates are produced using
regression models that control for the effects of observable characteristics and so
produce more precise estimates of effects. Third, duration analysis is used to model
the time until an event (entering work, for example) and the extent to which this is
affected by being in the treatment rather than the control group. These three
approaches are covered in turn below.
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4.1 Simple outcome estimates
A simple way of estimating the effect of mandating IAP is by comparing the average
outcomes of the action and control group members. Table 4.1 shows that 60 per
cent of participants in the action group and 70 per cent of the control group have left
ND25+ by end June 2004. 16 per cent of the action group and 13 per cent of the
control group entered unsubsidised employment from ND25+. This difference is not
significant at the conventional level but is on the margins of statistical significance.
However, there are significant differences when considering those leaving to other
destinations. Those in the action group are more likely to move to
Incapacity Benefit (IB) or another benefit; in total, 13 per cent of the action group
move to a non-JSA benefit compared to nine per cent of the control group.
Furthermore, while nine per cent of the action group return to a regular pattern of
signing for JSA, the corresponding figure for the control group is 31 per cent.
Table 4.1 Destination states on ND25+, by customer group
Action group (Col. %) Control group (Col. %) Difference in
percentage points
Still on ND25+ 40 30 10*
Left ND25+ to
Unsubsidised employment 16 13 3&
Incapacity benefit 8 6 2*
Other (non-IB) benefit 5 3 2&
Gone abroad 1 1 -1
Government training 3 1 2*
Other known destination 4 5 0
Unknown destination 14 10 4*
Carried on signing JSA 9 31 -22*
Number of participants 1,073 988
* significant >= 95%, & significant 90%
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005 (41% are still on ND25+)
Table 4.2 compares how long individuals spend on ND25+. For those in the action
group, the mean duration is 137 days. This is 23 days longer than the mean duration
for the control group. A similar difference can be observed between the date of
random assignment and the date when the participants finally left ND25+. This
suggests that one consequence of mandating IAP is that individuals remain longer
on ND25+.
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Table 4.2 Duration on ND25+, by customer group
Action group Control group Mean difference
(in days)
Mean duration between beginning
of and end of programme 137 114 23*
Mean duration between RA date
and end of programme 136 113 23*
Number of participants 1,073 988
* significant >= 95%
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
To get a clearer insight into how the treatment affects outcomes one must address
the fact that individuals vary in how long they are observed post-ND25+ entry. The
results that follow do this by considering outcomes relative to the date of random
assignment, as discussed in Section 3.4.4.
Table 4.3 reports the proportion of customers who leave ND25+ at specific periods
following random assignment. This is a similar approach to that described in Section
3.4.4. It has the advantage of maximising the number of observations on which each
effect is estimated. A natural consequence of this is that estimates of outcomes
shortly after random assignment are based on a larger number of observations than
estimates of outcomes a long time after random assignment. In view of this,
subsequent tables report the numbers of participants that can be observed at the
specific dates chosen.
The results in Table 4.3 show that the action group has higher outflows to
employment than the control group. 105 days after random assignment, 11 per
cent of the action group has entered unsubsidised employment compared to 9 per
cent of the control group. The difference becomes more pronounced over time and
eventually becomes statistically significant: 39-45 weeks after random assignment
(273-315 days), the employment rate is five-six percentage points higher for the
action group than for the control group. This corresponds to an unsubsidised
employment entry rate of around 21-22 per cent for the action group compared to
only 14-15 per cent for the control group. The significance of this effect subsequently
falls. It is likely that this is due to the smaller number of observations on which it is
possible to estimate longer term effects – clearly, the final report from this evaluation
will be informative here.
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Table 4.3 Proportions leaving to unsubsidised employment 0-60
weeks after RA, by customer group
Action group Control group
Days after % of Number % of Number of % point
random customer of customers customer customers difference in
assignment group of group group of group employment
with exit to with exit to outcome
 unsubsidised unsubsidised
employment employment
7 0 1,070 0 985 0
21 2 1,071 2 985 0
35 4 1,056 3 977 1
49 5 1,019 4 942 1
63 7 995 5 925 2
77 8 964 7 902 2
91 10 948 8 869 2
105 11 910 9 838 2
119 13 874 11 805 2
133 14 840 12 779 2
147 15 808 13 743 2
161 16 773 13 708 3
175 16 741 13 666 3
189 16 689 14 622 2
203 17 643 14 591 3
217 17 638 14 582 3
231 18 603 15 551 3
245 18 563 15 520 3
259 19 518 15 478 4
273 20 487 15 454 5*
287 20 444 15 406 5*
301 22 410 15 380 6*
315 21 373 14 346 6*
329 21 342 16 321 5
343 22 312 16 292 6
357 21 280 16 256 6
371 21 246 16 233 5
385 21 214 17 195 4
399 21 160 17 158 4
413 22 116 15 119 6
* significant >= 95%
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
Table 4.4 considers exits to non-JSA benefits. The results show very little difference
between the action and control groups to begin with. However, after 25 weeks (day
175), the table shows a significant difference of four percentage points. The timing
of the effect corresponds closely to the timing of IAP entry for those mandated to
participate. This is suggestive of a deterrent effect – individuals may choose to exit
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JSA rather than participate in the IAP against their will. This difference remains
significant and fairly constant until 41 weeks (287 days) after random assignment.
Beyond this point, it is insignificant. Again, this is likely to be due to the reduced
sample size available for the analysis of long-term outcomes.
Table 4.4 Proportions leaving to non-JSA benefit 0-60 weeks after
RA, by customer group
Action group Control group
Days after % of Number of % of Number of % point
random customer customers customer customers difference
assignment group with of group group with of group  in exit to
exit to exit to non-JSA
non-JSA non-JSA benefit
benefit benefit
7 1 1,070 1 985 0
21 3 1,071 3 985 0
35 4 1,056 4 977 0
49 5 1,019 4 942 0
63 5 995 5 925 0
77 6 964 6 902 0
*91 7 948 7 869 0
105 8 910 7 838 1
119 9 874 8 805 1
133 10 840 9 779 2
147 11 808 9 743 2
161 11 773 9 708 3
175 12 741 8 666 4*
189 12 689 9 622 4*
203 13 643 9 591 3*
217 13 638 10 582 4
231 14 603 10 551 4
245 14 563 10 520 4*
259 15 518 9 478 5*
273 15 487 10 454 6*
287 15 444 10 406 5*
301 15 410 11 380 4
315 14 373 10 346 4
329 13 342 11 321 3
343 14 312 11 292 3
357 15 280 11 256 4
371 15 246 12 233 3
385 16 214 13 195 3
399 16 160 11 158 5
413 14 116 11 119 3
* significant >= 95
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
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As an additional outcome, Table 4.5 shows the effect of the mandate on exits to IB.
As exits to IB account for the majority of all exits to non-JSA benefits, the results are
very similar to those shown in Table 4.4, although generally not as significant. As
before, there is a significant effect of the mandate 175 days after random
assignment, by which time around nine per cent of the action group will have exited
to IB, compared to six per cent of the control group.
Table 4.5 Proportions leaving to IB 0-60 weeks after RA, by
customer group
Action group Control group
Days after % of Number of % of Number of % point
random customer customers of customer customers of difference
assignment group with group group with group in exit to
exit to IB exit to IB non-JSA
benefit
7 1 1,070 0 985 0
21 2 1,071 2 985 0
35 2 1,056 3 977 0
49 3 1,019 3 942 0
63 3 995 3 925 0
77 4 964 4 902 0
*91 4 948 5 869 -1
105 5 910 5 838 0
119 6 874 5 805 1
133 7 840 6 779 1
147 7 808 6 743 2
161 8 773 6 708 2
175 9 741 5 666 3*
189 9 689 6 622 3*
203 9 643 6 591 3
217 9 638 6 582 3
231 9 603 7 551 2
245 9 563 6 520 3
259 10 518 6 478 4
273 10 487 6 454 4*
287 10 444 7 406 3
301 10 410 7 380 3
315 10 373 7 346 3
329 10 342 7 321 2
343 10 312 8 292 3
357 11 280 7 256 4
371 11 246 8 233 3
385 11 214 9 195 2
399 12 160 8 158 4
413 10 116 7 119 4
* significant >= 95
Source: Merged customers’/ND25+ data, up to 27 June 2005
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4.2 Impact estimates based on regression models
This section reports the estimated treatment effects on three outcomes: exits to
unsubsidised employment, exits to non-JSA benefits and exits to all non-benefit
destinations (i.e. exits from benefit). These effects are estimated as average
differences in the shares of the action group leaving the programme to these
destination states compared to the control group, as already shown in Tables 4.3,
4.4 and 4.5. In contrast to the results in the last section, the results in this section are
estimated using regression models and so can control for the effect of observable
characteristics on the outcome in question. This helps to estimate the treatment
effect more precisely.
The estimated effects are presented graphically and show how the effect changes as
longer term outcomes are considered. The graphs all follow an identical format.
Length of time since random assignment is shown on the x-axis. The y-axis shows
the size of the estimated treatment effect as a percentage point difference between
the action and control group. A positive effect indicates that the treatment increases
the probability of the outcome in question. The significance of the estimates is
illustrated using confidence intervals. An estimate is significantly positive (or
negative) if its surrounding confidence interval are above (or below) zero (the x-axis).
As in the previous section, estimates of the effect on outcomes of different post
random assignment durations can only be estimated for those who are observed
sufficiently long after random assignment. Because of this, effects on longer-term
outcomes are estimated on a smaller sample than effects on shorter-term outcomes.
With this proviso in mind, estimates are based on all those randomised on or before
27 June 2005. Outcomes of up to 60 weeks post random assignment are
considered.
4.2.1 Employment and benefit outcomes
Figure 4.1 shows the estimated effect on unsubsidised employment. Generally, the
treatment effect is positive suggesting that mandating IAP increases the outflows to
employment. However, the positive effect in not significant for 36 weeks following
random assignment, i.e. the period of the Gateway. 253 days after the participants
were randomly assigned, we find a significantly positive outcome; the presence of
the mandate increased exits to unsubsidised employment by 4.9 percentage points.
This positive effect increases for later periods. For customers who can be observed
for a period of 343 days (49 weeks), the estimated effect is 7.9 percentage points.
Very few observations are available for consideration of longer term estimates and
this reduces the precision of such estimates. Consequently, the positive findings are
no longer significant for outcomes more than one year after random assignment.
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Figure 4.1 Employment effect of mandating IAP
Figure 4.2 shows the estimated effect on claiming benefits other than JSA. Again,
there is evidence of positive effects, although these are not always significant. The
effect of mandatory IAP on exits to non-JSA benefits is insignificant for a period up
to 24 weeks (168 days) after random assignment. For longer-term outcomes, no
significant effects were found. For outcomes between 24 weeks and 27 weeks after
random assignment, the regression models show a significant positive effect of
around three percentage points.
Figure 4.2 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP
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Participants beginning an IB claim after leaving the ND25+ are the most important
subgroup of those leaving JSA to other benefits. The results for this group are similar
to those for non-JSA benefits as a whole (Figure 4.3). Significant effects for leaving
the programme to IB were only found for a period between 24 weeks and 27 weeks
after random assignment, when the exit to IB is around three percentage points
higher for the action group than for the control group. However, exit rates of the
action group do not differ from those of the control group in the long run.
Figure 4.3 IB effect of mandating IAP
Figure 4.4 shows estimates of the effect on exits to all non-benefit destinations. This
consists of participants who have left to employment as well as those leaving to
'other known' and 'other unknown' destinations or who have moved abroad.8 For
the first 35 weeks, the estimated effect was positive but insignificant. A significant
positive effect of about five percentage points emerged after 35 weeks. From this
point on, the size of the effect grows (and remains significant). One year after
random assignment, the estimated effect is 13 percentage points. At the latest date
around 60 weeks after random assignment, the estimated effect is around 19
percentage points.
8 Note that those on government training are regarded as still being on benefit.
Evaluation results
62
An estimated effect of this size should prompt concern about the underlying data. It
is possible that individuals who spend longer on IAP are more likely to be recorded as
having left to an unknown destination. This would artificially increase the proportion
of those in the action group who appear to have left to a non-benefit destination.
Informal investigation of the data does not rule out this possibility. For now, the
longer-term results for this outcome must be regarded as tentative. We would hope
that by the time of the final report, any data uncertainties along these lines will be
addressed so more definite results can be presented.
Figure 4.4 Outcomes of mandatory IAP on non-benefit destinations
4.2.2 Variations in effectiveness by region
In this sub-section, results are presented showing the extent to which effectiveness
of the mandate appears to vary across three of the biggest Jobcentre Plus districts  –
Coventry and Warwickshire, Leicester and Essex. It should be noted that sub-group
results such as these are less precisely estimated than the overall results presented in
the previous sub-section since they reflect the smaller number of individuals in a
particular sub-group. This results in the wider confidence intervals evident in the
following graphs. With longer-term outcomes, it compounds the problem of
shrinking sample size already mentioned. By the time of the final report, more
precise estimates will be possible.
The estimates in Figures 4.5 to 4.7 show pronounced differences by district in the
effectiveness of mandatory IAP on employment. In Coventry and Warwick, the
positive effect becomes significant around 160 days following random assignment
(RA) at a level of about ten percentage points (as shown in Figure 4.1). This effect is
much higher (and still significant) around 38 weeks (270 days) after RA, when the
estimates show a difference of around 17 percentage points based on remaining
observations. The longest-term outcomes are not significant.
Evaluation results
63
Figure 4.5 Employment effect of mandating IAP, Coventry
Figure 4.6 shows the same outcome for Leicester. Here, the estimated effect is
insignificant throughout.
Figure 4.6 Employment effect of mandating IAP, Leicester
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Figure 4.7 represents the same outcome for Essex. A positive effect is evident for
some of the periods observed following RA but, for most of the period, the effects
are insignificant. Essex is an interesting area because the employment outcome of
the programme is significant for three periods. The first significant positive effect is
estimated for the period from 47 days until 84 days following RA, corresponding
very well to the part of the Gateway period that leads into IAP participation and,
therefore, might reveal some anticipatory effects in Essex that do not exist in a similar
way in other areas. The second period for which the estimates are significantly
positive lies around 129 days until 165 days after random assignment, at around the
time when IAP actually takes place. In both periods, the estimated treatment effect
is about ten percentage points. The long-term outcomes based on cohorts that can
be observed sufficiently long, are also significantly positive: for the period between
36 and 45 weeks following random assignment (252 to 318 days), there are positive
employment effects of around 11 and 14 percentage points. After that, the effect
remains positive, although insignificant.
Figure 4.7 Employment effect of mandating IAP, Essex
Figures 4.8 to 4.10 consider the effect on moving to non-JSA benefits. In Coventry
and Warwickshire, no significant effects are found.
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Figure 4.8 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, Coventry
The results for Leicester (Figure 4.9) are significantly positive for most of the time
between 91 and 155 days following RA that should roughly correspond to the
period of the mandatory IAP. This effect then becomes insignificant (although only
marginally) until 255 days following RA. The effects on outcomes one year after RA
are again positive and significant.
Figure 4.9 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, Leicester
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The effects in Essex appear to be positive but never reach statistical significance,
although this is marginal in some cases (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.10 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, Essex
Figures 4.11 – 4.13 show that the effects on movements into IB are broadly similar to
those for non-JSA benefits as a whole. In Coventry and Warwickshire, no significant
effects are found (Figure 4.11).
Figure 4.11 IB effect of mandating IAP, Coventry
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We found significant positive effects on exits to IB in Leicester (Figure 4.12). The
differences in exits to IB are insignificant for the period between 91 and 155 days
following RA, where a positive effect of the mandate was found for participants
leaving to any non-JSA benefit. Around one year after RA there is again a positive
and significant effect, which is slightly smaller compared to the exit to all non-JSA
benefits as shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.12 IB effect of mandating IAP, Leicester
The effect is insignificant in Essex (Figure 4.13), as it was when considering exits to all
non-JSA benefits.
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Figure 4.13 IB effect of mandating IAP, Essex
As a summary, the evidence suggests that mandating IAP has beneficial employment
effects in Coventry and Warwickshire and Essex, without the adverse effect of
moving individuals to other benefits. For Leicestershire, the results are different and
it appears that mandating IAP causes individuals to claim other benefits but not to
enter unsubsidised employment.
4.2.3 Variations in effectiveness by level of qualification
This sub-section considers how the treatment affects individuals with a particular
level of education. The results show large differences between the outcomes of
participants without formal qualifications and the other groups. As shown in Table
3.17, half of all customers report no qualifications and are therefore a key subgroup
of participants.
Figure 4.14 shows the effect on employment for those with no qualifications.
Significant positive effects averaging about six percentage points are evident after
29 weeks (roughly 200 days). This effect increases over time to 13 percentage points
around one year and two weeks following random assignment (day 384) before
becoming insignificant (although it remains similar in size).
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Figure 4.14 Employment effect of mandating IAP, without formal
education
A different effect is found for those with low level qualifications. Figure 4.15 shows
the estimated effects are not significant in most cases. Generally, the effect appears
negative indicating that, if anything, mandating IAP reduces the probability of
finding unsubsidised employment for this group. Mostly, the insignificance is
marginal and indeed some significant negative effects are found (e.g. for the period
around 35 weeks/245 days following RA, between 320 and 340 days after RA and
again for the period after one year and one week following RA).
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Figure 4.15 Employment effect of mandating IAP, NVQ level 1 or
equivalent
Figure 4.16 shows that there is a positive effect for participants with GCSEs or
equivalent qualifications. For this group, the regression models find significant
positive effects around 290 days following RA. The effect is stronger in the long run,
increasing to a level of around 25-30 percentage points.
Figure 4.16 Employment effect of mandating IAP, GCSEs or
equivalent
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For groups with a qualification at A-level standard or higher, mandatory IAP failed to
increase their likelihood of unsubsidised employment in the short- as well as in the
long-run (Figures 4.17-4.18).
Figure 4.17 Employment effect of mandating IAP, A levels or
equivalent
Figure 4.18 Employment effect of mandating IAP, Higher education
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The remaining results in this sub-section relate to the effect of mandating IAP on
claiming non-JSA benefits by level of qualification.
No significant effect was found for those with no qualifications (Figure 4.19)
indicating that mandating IAP does not cause such individuals to move to another
benefit.
Figure 4.19 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, without formal
education
Figure 4.20 considers those with low level qualifications. A significant positive effect
is evident between 242 days and 323 days following the day of RA indicating that
mandating IAP significantly increased the probability of claiming a non-JSA benefit
for this group. These differences become insignificant for longer-term outcomes.
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Figure 4.20 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, NVQ level 1 or
equivalent
A positive effect was also found for those with GCSE standard qualifications. Figure
4.21 shows an increased exit to non-JSA benefits between 160 days and 240 days
following RA.
Figure 4.21 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, GCSEs or
equivalent
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For participants with A-level standard qualification or higher, mandating IAP had no
significant effect on exits to non-JSA benefits (Figures 4.22 and 4.23).
Figure 4.22 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, A levels or
equivalent
Figure 4.23 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, Higher
education
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The effect on exits to IB for participants with no qualifications is shown in Figure
4.24. As with exits to all non-JSA benefits, no significant effect was found for this
group.
Figure 4.24 IB effect of mandating IAP, without formal education
For those with low-level qualifications, no effect on movement to IB is evident
(Figure 4.25). This differs from the result for non-JSA benefits as a whole (Figure
4.20) which shows a significant positive effect between 242 and 323 days following
the day of RA.
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Figure 4.25 IB effect of mandating IAP, NVQ level 1 or equivalent
Positive effects are found for participants with intermediate qualifications. Figure
4.26 shows the mandate increases exits to IB among those with GCSE level
qualifications by around ten percentage points between 160 days and 240 days
following RA. This is a similar result to that found for all non-JSA benefits as a whole.
Figure 4.26 IB effect of mandating IAP, GCSEs or equivalent
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For those with A-level or equivalent qualifications, no effect on movement to IB is
found (Figure 4.27).
Figure 4.27 IB effect of mandating IAP, A levels or equivalent
Figure 4.28 suggests no effect on movement to IB for those with higher education
qualifications.
Figure 4.28 IB effect of mandating IAP, Higher education
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As a summary, the results show that mandating IAP appears to work well for those
with no qualifications and those with GCSE or equivalent qualifications. It works
poorly for those with qualifications equivalent to NVQ level 1; they tend to avoid
employment and move to a non-JSA benefit as a result of mandating them to IAP.
The outcomes of those educated to A-level standard or higher appear unaffected by
the mandate.
4.2.4 Variations in effectiveness by IB pilot areas
As shown in Table 1.1, some pilot areas are also pilot areas for Pathways to Work. In
this sub-section, we consider the extent to which the results differ between
Pathways and non-Pathways areas.
Figures 4.29 and 4.30 show the effects on exits to unsubsidised employment.
Overall, the results are very similar for both types of area and none of the observed
differences is significant.
Figure 4.29 Employment effect of mandating IAP, IB Pilot areas
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Figure 4.30 Employment effect of mandating IAP, other areas
When considering exits to non-JSA benefits, the differences between Pathways and
non-Pathways areas are even smaller (Figures 4.31 and 4.32). As before, these
differences are not significant.
Figure 4.31 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, IB pilot areas
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Figure 4.32 Non-JSA benefit effect of mandating IAP, other areas
As shown in Figures 4.33 and 4.34, the results do not differ for exits to IB either.
Again, no significant differences are evident.
Figure 4.33 IB effect of mandating IAP, IB pilot areas
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Figure 4.34 IB effect of mandating IAP, other areas
Summarising the results in this sub-section, the evidence suggests that mandating
IAP had the same effects in Pathways and non-Pathways areas.
4.3 Impact estimates based on duration analysis
The key limitation of the results presented in Section 4.2 is that it is not possible to
assert that the change over time in the estimated treatment effect represents a true
evolution of the treatment effect rather than simply reflecting the changing
population on which the different estimates are based. One could argue, for
example, that the eventual emergence of a significant treatment effect is due to
those entering the experiment earlier in the pilot period (and therefore observed for
a longer period of time) being affected more than those entering the pilot later. This
means that it is not possible to distinguish changes over time in the treatment effect
from cohort effects.
In this section, the results of a different approach to estimating the treatment effect
are presented. Duration analysis9 is a standard econometric tool for modelling the
time until an event. Unlike the approach used in Section 4.2, duration models can
take account of the fact that individuals vary in the length of time post-RA they are
observed.10 Consequently, the treatment effect can be estimated in a single model
9 Also called survival analysis or hazard regression.
10 However, the results still suffer from the limitation that it is only the first exit
from ND25+ that is captured so no account is taken on sustainability of
employment or other longer-term issues.
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for the whole sample. It is important to note that such models can still provide
estimates that can be regarded as causal – the fact of random assignment
guarantees this. Indeed, Dolton and O’Neill (1996) used duration models to examine
the effect of Restart interviews on unemployment duration – Restart was also
piloted using random assignment.
4.3.1 An overview of duration analysis
The central concept in duration analysis is the ‘hazard’ rate. In the case of this
evaluation, this would be the probability of an individual exiting JSA at a particular
time conditional on not having exited before that point. It is also possible to consider
exits to a specific destination. When considering exits to unsubsidised employment,
for example, the hazard rate relates to the probability of exiting JSA to unsubsidised
employment at a given time, conditional on not having left JSA to employment
before that time.11
A key decision in duration analysis is how to characterise the hazard rate. It is often
unrealistic to assume that it is constant over time. For example, exits from
unemployment tend to be concentrated in the early stages of a spell and become
increasingly less likely as the spell lengthens. Such ‘duration dependence’ corresponds
to a declining hazard rate. The approach that is taken in this report is to avoid
imposing a particular form on the hazard rate but instead to allow it to vary flexibly
over the duration of the spell. This approach is dominant in modern duration
analysis.
While the underlying hazard may be flexible in the way outlined above, being in the
action group rather than the control group is assumed to have the same effect on
the hazard at all stages of the spell. This is quite a restrictive assumption since one
might imagine that the hazard rate is likely to vary over the duration of the spell. For
example, one possibility is that the hazard rate will increase more for the action
group than the control group as the time of entering IAP approaches. However, the
assumption of a constant effect is imposed since to do otherwise risks having the
results influenced by cohort effects – the very thing that the duration analysis is
being carried out to avoid. In the final report, the assumption of a constant effect will
be relaxed.
4.3.2 Describing exits from JSA
Before presenting the estimation results, it is helpful to describe the rate at which
individuals leave JSA. Figure 4.35 shows exits from JSA into unsubsidised employment.
Both lines in the chart represent the probability of remaining on JSA. The solid line
represents the control group while the dashed line represents the action group.
Basically, the steeper the line, the quicker individuals are to leave JSA and enter
employment. From this, it is clear that there is little difference between the action
and control groups over the first four months. After this point, those in the action
group are more likely to leave JSA for employment than those in the control group.
11 It is possible to consider multiple destinations simultaneously. However, this places
more demands on the data and so is not considered in this interim report.
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Figure 4.35 Probability of remaining on JSA rather than exiting to
employment
Figure 4.36 presents analogous results for exits to benefits other than JSA. The same
general pattern is evident with no difference found for the first four months or so
and then those in the action group being more likely than those in the control group
to move from JSA to a different benefit.
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Figure 4.36 Probability of remaining on JSA rather than exiting to a
non-JSA benefit
The same broad pattern is evident when considering exits to IB (Figure 4.37).
Figure 4.37 Probability of remaining on JSA rather than exiting to IB
Evaluation results
85
4.3.3 Estimation results
Duration analysis allows us to proceed beyond the descriptive stage and to examine
the extent to which mandating IAP has an effect on exits from JSA. As with the main
regression analysis results presented in the previous section, three outcomes are
considered: exits to employment, exits to non-JSA benefits and exits to IB. The full
results are presented in detail in Table A4.1 in the appendix to this chapter. This gives
three columns of results showing the overall effect of treatment on the hazard rate
for exits to employment, exits to non-JSA benefits and exits to IB respectively. We
discuss the key results below.
The hazard rate and the extent to which it changes over time can be seen in the first
six rows of Table A4.1. The coefficients represent the probability that, on any one
day, the representative individual12 leaves JSA to the destination given in the column
heading. For example, the first row of coefficients give the hazard rate for those who
are in the first post-random assignment month of their spell, the second row of
coefficients give the hazard rate for those who are in the second post-random
assignment month of their spell and so on. Across both columns, these effects are
very significant at all stages of the spell. To give some feel for the size of the hazards,
an estimate of 0.001 corresponds to a probability of exit on a given day of
one – tenth of one per cent.
The next rows in Table A4.1 show how the hazard rate varies with particular
characteristics. The coefficients represent the size of the hazard for those individuals
with that characteristic relative to the size of the hazard for individuals without that
characteristic. Accordingly, a value close to one indicates that the characteristic in
question has no effect on the hazard. The greater than one the estimated coefficient
is, the more it is associated with an increased hazard rate. The closer to zero the
estimated coefficient is, the more it is associated with a decreased hazard. Scanning
the table of results, it is easy to see which characteristics are associated with quicker
exit from JSA.
However, the main interest in this report is not in the effect of these characteristics
but rather in the effect of the treatment. This is captured by the final coefficient
labelled ‘Action group’ (shown in bold). Looking at the first column, a significant
effect on the hazard rate of exit to employment is evident. The coefficient is greater
than one, showing that mandating IAP increases the hazard by 32 per cent.
Similarly, the second column shows that mandating IAP increases the hazard rate of
exit to non-JSA benefits by 49 per cent. This is also significant. The third column
suggests that mandating IAP increases the hazard of exit to IB. However, this is only
marginally significant. So it appears that the treatment causes an increase in exits to
unsubsidised employment, to non-JSA benefits and possibly also to IB.
To make the estimated effects more meaningful, Table 4.6 uses the modelled
hazard rates to show the cumulative effect on exits over time. Six points in time are
considered: one, two, three, four, six and 12 months after random assignment. At
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each point, the size of the estimated effect is given. This represents the difference in
percentage points between those in the action group who are predicted to have left
by this point and those in the control group who are predicted to have left by this
point. A positive effect indicates that mandating IAP increases exits while a negative
effect indicates the opposite. Significant (at the five per cent level) effects are
indicated by an asterisk in the second column. Significance at the ten per cent level
is shown by a ‘+’.
Table 4.6 Estimated exits to employment and non-JSA benefits over
time
Destination: Months post random assignment:
1 2 3 4 6 12
Employment* 0.6 1.3 2.0 2.8 3.6 6.3
Non-JSA benefit* 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.8 5.0
IB+ 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 3.8
Variation by district
- Coventry Employment* 2.0 4.4 6.9 9.4 12.2 20.9
Non-JSA benefit 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
IB 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
- Leicester Employment -0.7 -1.6 -2.5 -3.4 -4.4 -7.7
Non-JSA benefit * 1.9 2.8 4.0 5.2 6.6 11.7
IB+ 1.5 2.1 2.9 3.9 5.1 9.4
- Essex Employment* 1.9 4.2 6.5 8.9 11.6 19.5
Non-JSA benefit 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.4 6.0
IB 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 3.7
Variation by qualification
- No quals Employment* 0.9 2.1 3.3 4.5 5.9 10.3
Non-JSA benefit 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.5
IB -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -1.5
- NVQ1 Employment -0.9 -2.1 -3.3 -4.4 -5.7 -9.5
Non-JSA benefit * 1.5 2.3 3.2 4.2 5.3 9.7
IB+ 1.2 1.7 2.3 3.2 4.2 7.9
- GCSE Employment 0.9 2.0 3.1 4.3 5.5 9.0
Non-JSA benefit * 1.4 2.1 3.0 3.9 5.0 9.1
IB* 1.9 2.7 3.9 5.2 6.8 12.5
- A-Level Employment 0.6 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.7 6.5
Non-JSA benefit * 1.5 2.2 3.2 4.1 5.2 9.5
IB 1.6 2.2 3.2 4.3 5.6 10.3
- Higher Ed. Employment 0.6 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.7 6.3
Non-JSA benefit 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 3.0
IB+ 1.2 1.7 2.4 3.3 4.3 7.9
The first three rows in Table 4.6 correspond to the results already presented. As
discussed, the effects of the mandate on exits to employment and to other benefits
are both significant at the five per cent level, while the effect on exits to IB is
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significant only at the ten per cent level. They are also broadly comparable in size.
After a year, the effect on exits to employment is in the order of six percentage
points. The corresponding effect on exits to non-JSA benefits is five percentage
points. For exits to IB, the effect is about four percentage points.
Further insight is permitted by allowing the effect to vary across different
characteristics. Subsequent rows in Table 4.6 replicate the approach of the
regression analysis by considering how the results vary by district and level of
education. The results are quite consistent with the regression results in finding
significant employment effects in Coventry and Warwickshire and in Essex but not in
Leicester. The results for Coventry and Warwickshire (about 21 percentage points
after a year) are similar in size to those presented in the previous section while the
effects in Essex (about 20 percentage points) are slightly larger. The estimated
effects on exits to non-JSA benefits are also consistent with the results of the
previous section. Mandating IAP appears to cause those in Leicester to move to
other benefits (an effect of about 12 percentage points after a year) but not those in
Coventry and Warwickshire or in Essex (the estimated effects are insignificant). The
estimated effects on exits to IB also resemble the regression results; it is only for those
in Leicester that a significant effect is detected.
The final set of results show how the treatment effects vary by level of education. As
with the earlier regression results, we see that the mandate causes those without
any formal qualifications to enter unsubsidised employment. The size of this effect is
also consistent at about ten percentage points a year after random assignment.
However, no other significant effects on employment were found. Turning to the
effect on movement onto non-JSA benefits, no significant effect is found for those
without qualifications. This is consistent with the regression results. However,
significant effects of about nine-ten percentage points a year after RA are found for
those with qualifications at the level of NVQ1, GCSE or A-level. Finally, the effects on
exits to IB resemble to some extent the effects found using regression analysis.
Specifically, the most significant effects are found among those with GCSE or
equivalent level qualification. For them, mandating IAP appears to increase the
probability of moving to IB by about 12 percentage points.
Overall, the results of the duration analysis broadly accord with those of the
regression analysis and provide some reassurance that those earlier results are not
being driven purely by cohort effects. However, there are some differences,
particularly when considering variations in the treatment effect across those with
different levels of qualification.
4.4 Summarising the main results
As noted at the start of this chapter, the results presented above should be
interpreted with caution and a fuller analysis, based on more observations and
looking beyond first destination on ND25+ exit, will be available in the final report.
However, it is of interest to consider the early indications of the effect of mandating
IAP.
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The results suggest that mandating IAP increases the probability of moving from
ND25+ into work by about five or six percentage points. Movements onto other
benefits also appear to increase, although the significance of this finding varies over
time. The effects found using duration analysis appear more significant than those
resulting from regression analysis. It will be interesting to investigate whether this
difference remains when basing estimates on the final sample. When considering
movements to IB, the regression results and the duration analysis results both
suggest effects of marginal significance.
The results indicate some variation by region. Movement into employment appears
to have been increased in Coventry and Warwickshire and Essex but not in Leicester,
which was more likely to show an increase in movements to other benefits as a result
of mandating IAP.
Considering education, it is among those with no qualifications that the most
consistent employment effects were found. This is a positive finding since this group
accounts for roughly half the sample. The regression results also suggest an increase
in job entry among those with GCSE level qualifications. However, this is not found
by the duration analysis. This apparent contradiction is perhaps indicative of a cohort
effect; since the sample on which the regression results are based changes as longer-
term outcomes are considered, it may be that there is something about those
randomised earlier in the experiment that predisposes them to being more affected
(the duration analysis results are not subject to this changing sample definition).
The patterns of movements onto other benefits or movements onto IB are a little
more mixed. The regression results suggest the mandate may induce those with
NVQ level 1 or GCSE equivalent qualifications to move to other benefits, but full
consideration is made difficult by the small number of observations. The duration
analysis finds similar results but also suggests a positive effect among those with
A-level qualifications. The strongest effects on movements to IB appears among
those with GCSE level qualifications.
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5 Conclusion
This report documents the progress to date with the evaluation of mandating
Intensive Activity Period (IAP) for those on ND25+ aged 50-59. Unusually for a UK
evaluation, this is based on a random assignment (RA) approach.
Overall, the evaluation appears to be progressing well and robust estimates of the
effect of the mandate as implemented should be possible by the time of the final
report. However, a number of problems have been described in the report. Most
importantly:
• the number of individuals included in the experiment is smaller than predicted;
• the implementation of the experiment has not always been as planned.
Both of these problems reduce the size of the sample on which the evaluation is
based. A strong recommendation of this interim report is that the reasons for such
deviations from the design continue to be investigated and proper implementation
be encouraged where appropriate for the remaining duration of the pilots.
In considering the substantive findings, it should be borne in mind that this is an
interim report and fuller results will become available later. With this caveat in mind,
the early indications are of a generally positive effect of the mandate, with increased
employment and only a small effect on movement to other benefits. The results also
suggest variation in effectiveness across region and level of qualification.
However, an important limitation of this analysis is that the data only allow
consideration of first exit from ND25+. A fuller analysis will allow sustainability of
employment, for example, to be examined. Should the mandate only encourage
short-term jobs, the view of its effectiveness will change accordingly. In view of this,
the second strong recommendation of this interim report is that adequate data be
made available to investigate outcomes beyond initial ND25+ exit. This additional
data should include administrative benefit records and could also include
administrative records on employment spells and even survey data, if that were felt
to be appropriate.
Conclusion
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Duration analysis results
Table A4.1 Duration analysis results
(1) (2) (3)
unsubsidised employment Non-JSA benefits IB
Baseline hazard:
- 1 month since RA 0.001 0.001 0.000
[20.87]** [17.17]** [14.69]**
- 2 months since RA 0.001 0.000 0.000
[20.15]** [17.83]** [15.28]**
- 3 months since RA 0.001 0.000 0.000
[20.00]** [17.47]** [14.97]**
- 4 months since RA 0.001 0.000 0.000
[19.47]** [17.23]** [14.63]**
- 5-6 months since RA 0.001 0.000 0.000
[20.76]** [18.19]** [15.54]**
- more than 6 months since RA 0.000 0.000 0.000
[22.37]** [19.36]** [16.65]**
Age at time of RA:
-51 0.895 1.682 1.615
[0.45] [1.35] [1.06]
-52 0.671 2.038 1.807
[1.46] [1.86]+ [1.28]
-53 0.882 2.059 2.067
[0.51] [1.98]* [1.69]+
-54 0.767 2.629 2.552
[1.06] [2.73]** [2.23]*
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(1) (2) (3)
unsubsidised employment Non-JSA benefits IB
-55 0.994 2.001 1.721
[0.03] [1.85]+ [1.21]
-56 0.795 2.029 1.670
[0.91] [1.86]+ [1.12]
-57 0.631 2.048 2.168
[1.74]+ [1.91]+ [1.77]+
-58 0.432 2.929 2.633
[2.58]** [2.87]** [2.16]*
-59 0.740 4.368 1.723
[0.98] [3.93]** [1.03]
Non-white ethnic group 0.492 1.295 1.440
[3.05]** [1.26] [1.46]
Lives with partner 1.132 0.751 0.682
[0.78] [1.41] [1.47]
Lives with partner who works 0.928 0.946 0.918
[0.33] [0.16] [0.19]
Disabled 0.809 1.692 1.893
[1.63] [3.68]** [3.53]**
Has drivers licence 0.960 0.897 1.086
[0.23] [0.61] [0.38]
Has drivers licence and access to car 2.302 1.379 1.138
[4.65]** [1.50] [0.49]
Working part-time at time of RA 2.366 0.758 0.630
[4.93]** [0.94] [1.16]
Occupation before ND25+:
- semi-skilled 1.156 1.316 1.170
[0.81] [1.41] [0.66]
- skilled 1.142 1.234 0.883
[0.70] [0.93] [0.43]
- office 0.757 1.136 0.809
[0.96] [0.42] [0.53]
- professional 0.564 1.622 1.448
[2.06]* [1.55] [0.98]
- managerial 1.301 1.720 0.986
[1.15] [1.86]+ [0.04]
Type of accommodation tenure at time of RA
- owned 1.248 0.818 1.048
[1.34] [1.03] [0.20]
- private tenant 0.864 0.907 0.959
[0.82] [0.53] [0.18]
- other 0.773 0.818 0.901
[1.03] [0.75] [0.31]
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(1) (2) (3)
unsubsidised employment Non-JSA benefits IB
Pension 0.817 0.611 0.582
[1.39] [2.44]* [2.08]*
Highest qualification at time of RA:
- NVQ level 1 equivalent 1.322 0.591 0.509
[1.40] [2.03]* [1.90]+
- GCSE equivalent 1.433 0.699 0.934
[1.94]+ [1.47] [0.24]
- A level equivalent 1.002 0.627 0.874
[0.01] [1.63] [0.40]
- higher education 1.176 0.709 0.760
[0.77] [1.31] [0.81]
District:
- Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute 1.133 1.225 2.230
[0.23] [0.32] [1.22]
- Gateshead & South Tyneside 3.717 2.752 3.155
[3.26]** [2.27]* [2.12]*
- East Lancashire 1.798 1.228 1.239
[2.07]* [0.70] [0.61]
- Calderdale & Kirklees 1.491 1.057 1.626
[1.08] [0.13] [1.04]
- Bridgend, Rhonda , Cynon & Taff 0.721 0.974 1.093
[0.88] [0.08] [0.22]
- Coventry & Warwick 1.148 0.637 0.649
[0.55] [1.51] [1.17]
- Shropshire 1.908 1.092 1.173
[1.96]* [0.21] [0.32]
- Derbyshire 1.071 1.747 2.003
[0.16] [1.24] [1.28]
- Essex 1.165 1.002 1.059
[0.66] [0.01] [0.19]
- Suffolk 1.930 0.983 0.712
[2.45]* [0.05] [0.68]
- Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 1.039 0.484 0.326
[0.15] [2.00]* [2.04]*
- Hampshire 0.873 1.419 1.186
[0.50] [1.41] [0.53]
- Somerset 1.110 1.231 1.610
[0.27] [0.54] [1.06]
Month of RA:
- Apr-04 0.936 0.964 0.832
[0.21] [0.12] [0.47]
- May-04 1.004 0.432 0.322
[0.02] [2.27]* [2.25]*
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(1) (2) (3)
unsubsidised employment Non-JSA benefits IB
- Jul-04 1.267 0.737 0.754
[0.88] [0.98] [0.78]
- Aug-04 1.022 0.481 0.539
[0.08] [2.11]* [1.58]
- Sep-04 1.210 1.069 0.739
[0.72] [0.23] [0.80]
- Oct-04 0.996 0.712 0.517
[0.01] [1.10] [1.63]
- Nov-04 0.595 0.953 0.801
[1.66]+ [0.17] [0.66]
- Dec-04 0.980 0.864 0.590
[0.06] [0.44] [1.24]
- Jan-05 0.949 0.529 0.510
[0.19] [1.88]+ [1.72]+
- Feb-05 1.058 0.887 0.590
[0.19] [0.36] [1.25]
- Mar-05 1.102 0.534 0.353
[0.31] [1.57] [1.99]*
- Apr-05 0.998 0.697 0.574
[0.00] [0.90] [1.13]
- May-05 1.552 0.951 0.440
[1.00] [0.10] [1.08]
- Jun-05 2.936 1.056 1.310
[1.94]+ [0.09] [0.41]
Action group (treatment effect) 1.324 1.487 1.401
[2.31]* [2.78]** [1.91]+
Observations 2049 2049 2049
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Coefficients represent the hazard for an individual with a given characteristic relative to an
individual without that characteristic.  The exceptions to this are the ‘baseline’ hazard terms (the
first six terms in the table) which give the hazard rate for the reference individual at a given time
post-random assignment.  The reference individual has the following characteristics: age – 50;
ethnic group – white; partnership status – unpartnered; disability status – not disabled; drivers
licence – yes; working part-time at time of RA – no; previous occupation – manual; accommoda-
tion tenure type – council or social tenant; pension arrangement – none; qualifications – none;
district – Leicestershire; month of random assignment – June 2004.
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